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date in the future. We derive a tractable reduced form Mincerian model of log earnings
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les along the life cycle which is written as a linear factor model in which levels, growth
and curvature of earnings proles are individual-specic. Using panel data from a single
cohort of French male wage earners observed over a long span of 30 years, a random e¤ect
model is estimated rst by pseudo maximum likelihood methods. This step is followed by a
simple second step xed e¤ect method by which individual-specic structural parameters
are estimated. This allows us to test restrictions, compute counterfactual pro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1 Introduction1
Since the seminal work by Lillard and Willis (1978) on the estimation of reduced form earnings
dynamics an extensive literature has emerged. Its main motivation comes from the assessment of
di¤erences between short-run and long-run earnings inequalities (see for instance Bönke, Corneo
and Lüthen, 2011 for a survey) and from the joint modeling of consumption and income variance
(for instance, Meghir and Pistaferri, 2010). While a very large set of empirical studies estimating
ARMA models on earnings residuals has been conducted over recent years, the literature has
not reached any consensus on a unique specication of the earnings process. Most authors
admit that a mixed process with individual-specic e¤ects along with autoregressive and moving
average components seems necessary to t the longitudinal change in earnings dispersion that is
commonly observed although they do not agree on the description of earnings growth. Several
papers have considered a beauty contest between a specication in which earnings growth is
random and a specication in which earnings growth is governed by a linear trend multiplied
by a xed individual e¤ect (see Baker, 1997, Guvenen, 2009, and Hryshko, 2012, for instance).
Yet, the theoretical structural background justifying the reduced forms used in these papers are
unclear although additional structure would help discriminating between them.
This is why the rst contribution of this paper is to develop an empirically tractable theoret-
ical model of human capital investments accommodating substantial unobserved heterogeneity
and from which we derive a convenient reduced-form for the dynamics of earnings in logar-
ithms as this is the most popular specication. We follow Mincer (1974) and more specically
his research program on post schooling wage growth Accounting identity model as presented by
Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006) and as formalized in the theoretical model of Ben Porath
(1967). We explain di¤erences in individual earnings life-cycle proles by heterogenous choices
of human capital investments driven by heterogeneous individual characteristics. In a sense, we
are extending to post-school investments what has been developed times ago by Heckman (see
Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2006, for a survey) and Card (for instance in the Econometrica
lecture in 2001) for schooling investments in human capital.
The model delivers the well known predictions of a human capital setting (Rubinstein and
Weiss, 2006). Earnings prole are increasing and concave and this reects the shortening of the
1This is a substantially revised version of an earlier paper of ours presented at the 1st French Econometrics
Workshop in 2009. We thank Christian Belzil and Bernard Salanié for helpful discussions and seminar participants
at Yale, Tilburg, Toulouse, CREST, Pompeu Fabra, Leuven University, Panel Data12 in Paris, ESEM12 in
Malaga, Jean-Pierre FlorensFestschrift in Toulouse, Duke and Hong Kong University for their helpful comments.
All errors remain ours.
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investment horizon. Second, the variance of earnings has a U-shape along the life-cycle because
large-returns investors have a steeper earnings prole than low-returns individuals experiencing
a atter prole and these proles cross after a few years. Third, because investments in human
capital are more intensive at the beginning of the life cycle for the high return investors, the
cross-section correlation, at the beginning of the life cycle, between earnings growth and level is
negative although this correlation increases along the life-cycle and becomes positive.
Adopting a highly stylized human capital model comes at the price of symplifying other
elements that might drive earnings dynamics. We rst take as given past investments in schooling
although this is an important heterogeneity dimension in our model. We treat search and job
mobility as frictions under the form of exogenous shocks (see e.g. Postel-Vinay and Turon, 2010).
Some reduced-form specications such as Alvarez, Browning and Erjnaes (2010) who try to model
the whole distributions of earnings are richer in terms of heterogeneity but ours is enough to
model life-cycle proles of mean and variances of earnings that condition the main diagnostics
about life-cycle earnings inequality. We neglect taxes because we cannot reconstruct their value
from our data and we nd a simple way of modeling the interactions between investments and
uncertainty which partially neutralize the importance of risk (see e.g. Huggett, Ventura and
Yaron, 2011). Finally, we do not model general equilibrium e¤ects as in Heckman, Lochner and
Taber (1998).
In a nutshell, the model developed in this paper summarizes life-cycle proles of individual
earnings by a limited number of individual-specic components which are economically inter-
pretable. Individuals di¤er in four dimensions. Firstly, they have di¤erent initial human capital
levels when they enter the labor market. Secondly, they di¤er in their returns to skill invest-
ments, that is, some are more productive in transforming invested time in productive skills as
in Mincers original model. We also assume that the marginal cost of producing skills is het-
erogenous within the population. Finally, we allow the terminal value of human capital to vary
across individuals and infer from the curvature of the earnings prole, the implicit horizon of
investment that agents consider. This follows a suggestion by Lillard and Reville (1999) insisting
on this crucial aspect of earnings growth. As a result of this set-up, this model predicts a linear
factor model for the earnings equation in which factor loadings are functions of the individual
specic structural parameters. Some structural restrictions are testable and some structural
parameters can be identied while others are only partially identied. Ironically, our set-up is
able to generate the two most popular specications random growth and random walk used
in the reduced form literature albeit in a sequential way along the life cycle.
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Our second contribution is to estimate the model on a very long panel for a single cohort of
male French wage earners working in the private sector and observed from 1977 to 2007. DADS
data is an administrative dataset collecting earnings in the private sector and having advantages
and drawbacks for our purpose. The rst key advantage is that it includes enough observations
so that we can study a large single cohort of individuals (more than 7,000). They enter the labor
market simultaneously and face the same economic environment over their life-cycle, in contrast
with most studies of earnings dynamics that must pool di¤erent cohorts to collect samples
large enough (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2010). Secondly, as the data come from social security
records, we expect fewer measurement errors than in usual surveys or other administrative
data although this is not entirely convincing in our application. Finally, the DADS data are
long and homogeneous enough to study the dynamics of earnings over a long period of time.
We will see that we nd much longer dependence for transitory earnings than what is usually
found in the literature. These data have shortcomings as well since rst, few other individual
characteristics than age and broad skill groupings are available. The panel is also a¤ected by
attrition since some individuals leave the private sector, temporarily or denitely, because of
unemployment, self-employment, non-participation or because they start working in the public
sector. This explains why we choose to use male earnings data only in order to mitigate the
non-participation selection issue.
Our third contribution is an original empirical strategy that uses a sequence of random and
xed e¤ect methods in order to be able to compute interesting counterfactuals i.e. the non-
linear impacts of changes in the environment. We rst estimate the model by random e¤ect
pseudo maximum likelihood (Alvarez and Arellano, 2004) and then derive xed e¤ect estimates
of the individual factors in a second step. As xed e¤ect estimates are biased, we evaluate their
bias and show that it becomes second-order when the number of period observations is roughly
above 20. We also correct for bias and nd that it tends to overcorrect. Using those xed e¤ect
estimates, we evaluate structural restrictions and compute estimates of the structural unobserved
heterogeneity terms. This enables us to construct counterfactuals measuring the impact of
changes in those structural estimates. The alternative strategy of estimating distributions of
individual-specic e¤ects as in Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) turns out to be di¢ cult
because of structural constraints on individual e¤ects while direct xed e¤ect estimation is
performed at a reasonable cost.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. In the rst-step random e¤ect estimation,
we nd that ARMA orders for individual-and-period specic shocks are much larger than in the
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literature. Our preferred specication is an ARMA(3,1) in which period-heteroskedastic variance
decreases over time. This indicates much longer persistence than usually thought although the
presence of a unit root is strongly rejected as in for instance Alvarez et al (2010) or Alvarez and
Arellano (2004). Levels and growth of earnings are positively correlated in the long run and
long-run and initial levels are negatively correlated which corroborates one of the predictions of
the human capital setting as seen above. Finally, the larger the level and the slope of earnings
proles, the more concave they are and this stems from the horizon e¤ect.
The second step xed e¤ect estimates show that structural restrictions are satised in most
of the sample although there seems to exist a small fraction of earnings proles which do not
agree with the set-up. It is our maintained assumption that human capital investments are
positive until the end of the observation period that seems mostly rejected.
Finally, a counterfactual analysis shows that an increase in the horizon of investment or life
expectancy by two years increases means and variances of earnings, above all at the end of the
observation period and those increases can be attributed to investment heterogeneity between
individuals. Cross-section inequality increases by around 20% at the end of the period although
this gure has quite a large standard error.
In the next Section we briey review the literature on the estimation and the empirics of
earnings equations. Next in Section 3, we describe the model of human capital accumulation and
derive the structural equation for log earnings. In Section 4 we present our empirical strategy
and detail the econometric estimation methods that we use. Data are described in Section 5
and results are presented in Section 6. After a discussion of a possible extension, a nal Section
concludes.
2 A Brief Review of the Literature
The literature connected to what we are doing is huge and this brief presentation cannot sum-
marize all these connections in a comprehensive way.
First, the empirical literature on earnings dynamics, as reviewed in Meghir and Pistaferri
(2010), began with the seminal works by Lillard and Willis (1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979) and
MaCurdy (1982). These papers are the starting points of the random growth and random walk
specications that are designed to t the evolution of variance of earnings over the life cycle 
or more exactly of their residuals after a rst-stage regression on covariates like education and
age as well as their autocorrelation.
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The random growth or heterogeneous income prole model consists in having unobserved
heterogeneity in levels as well as in rst di¤erences or growth in earnings. This model was
estimated on various datasets, though mostly the PSID, and their results are reported in papers
by Lillard and coauthors cited above, and for instance by Hause (1980), Lillard and Reville
(1999) on US data, Dickens (2000) on U.K. data, Cappellari (2004) on Italian data, Sologon and
ODonoghue (2009) on European data and many others. Importantly, this specication allows
to test Mincers (1974) theoretical prediction that the variance of earnings should decrease at
the beginning of the life cycle until those highly investing in human capital catch up weaker
investors. Empirically this would translate into a negative covariance between the individual
heterogeneity terms in level and growth and this result has been conrmed by these studies.
The random walk model of MaCurdy (1982), alternatively called restricted income prole
posits that earnings residuals are the sum of a random walk and a transitory earnings process
which is of an ARMA type. The same specication has also been estimated by Abowd and Card
(1989), Mo¢ t and Gottschalk (1995, 2002, 2008), Kalwij and Alessie (2007) although there are
variations in the orders of ARMA processes which are used in those papers.
Baker (1997) was the rst to compare the performance of random growth and random walk
models. He primarily concluded that tests of one against the other had low power even if the
randow walk seems to slightly dominate the other. Guvenen (2007) followed up and studied
the implications of the form of the income process on consumption inequality. He compares
predictions of random walk and random growth models using life cycle consumption and simu-
lated data. Guvenen concludes that a model with heterogenous earnings growth is better able
to replicate the observed change in consumption inequality than a model with a unit root. In
Guvenen (2009) the sources of identication between the two income processes are more deeply
investigated. A major di¤erence between the model in which agents have heterogenous earnings
proles and the model in which they are subject to persistent shocks is that in the former case,
the autocorrelation of rst di¤erences of earnings residuals remains signicant because of the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity in earnings growth. Guvenens analysis favours the hetero-
genous growth specication. In contrast, Hryshko (2012) arrives at the opposite conclusion that
random walk specication o¤ers the best t when trying to test random walk against random
growth specications using PSID data on earnings and a xed number of ARMA lags.
Other contributions have generalized the model in the direction of non linear and non normal
models that would allow a less parametrically driven view of what happens in the tails of
the earnings distribution. Geweke and Keane (2000) implements Bayesian inference methods
6
and show that the share of variance explained by permanent individual heterogeneity terms is
larger than under a Gaussian model. Hirano (2002) uses a Bayesian framework to propose a
semi-parametric estimator for autoregressive panel data models. Bonhomme and Robin (2009)
focus on the same issue and model the change over time in earnings using copula. Marginal
distributions of earnings are fully non parametric and the joint distribution is exibly modelled
over a three-year span of panel data.
Alvarez, Browning and Ejrnaes (2010) allows for a lot of heterogeneity and non-linearities
in earnings distributions in order to get a better t of the tails of the earnings distribution and
estimate the model using indirect inference. In contrast with Hryshko (2012), they do not nd
any evidence of a unit root in the dynamics. In a di¤erent vein, Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)
postulate a non-linear ARCH(1) data generating process for the permanent and for the transitory
shocks. Estimating the model by educational group, Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) conclude
that the variance of shocks is persistent in some education groups. In a similar framework,
Hospido (2010) models the heterogenous variance of earnings but instead of implementing a
GMM approach, she uses bias-corrected likelihood methods. Finally, an alternative strand of
research simultaneously consider earnings dynamics and mobility on the labor market (see for
example Altonji, Smith and Vidangos, 2009).
Methodological issues also arise in this context. The model of earnings residuals that we
specify in this paper can be viewed as resulting into a specic covariance structure over time
that can be tted to the empirical covariance of earnings. Minimum distance as in Abowd and
Card (1989) is severely small-sample biased (see Arellano, 2004 for a review) and although the
emphasis in the dynamic panel data literature is slightly di¤erent, the lessons from this literature
are useful to remember here. As is well known in GMM estimation, the range of moments
involved when the time dimension becomes larger makes rst order asymptotics a poor guide in
empirical research. This is why some researchers proposed to return to an OLS set up adding a
bias correction step (Hahn and Kuersteiner, 2002) or to maximum or quasi-maximum likelihood
estimators (Hsiao, Pesaran and Tahmiscioglu, 2002, Dhaene and Jochmans, 2009). Another
direction was recently proposed by Han, Philips and Sul (2010) in the case of AR(p) models
under mean stationarity whose properties are robust and simple to derive under both stationary
and non stationary cases.
As T is neither large nor small in our application and as we stick to a framework in which
the initial conditions are supposed to have been generated by another stochastic process so that
asymptotic stationarity properties are not satised, the GMM framework remains our reference.
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Alvarez and Arellano (2003) analyses the asymptotic properties of GMM estimators using double
asymptotics in N and T . Okui (2009) derives the small sample biases not only in the mean but
also in the variance of GMM estimates because of the presence of too many moments even
in the case in which T is small. Okui suggests some moment selection mechanism in order
to limit the importance of these biases by, to put it briey, selecting out moments between
variables which are too far apart in time. Those moments are far more likely to contribute
to larger bias and not to smaller variance. There is another route through quasi-maximum
likelihood methods that reduces the number of moments available for estimation as suggested
by Alvarez and Arellano (2004). In a comparison with other xed T consistent estimators, this
estimator seems to dominate in most Monte Carlo exercises the maximum likelihood estimator
using di¤erenced data (Hsiao et al., 2002) and the corrected within group estimator. In their
application to PSID, they do not nd any evidence of a unit root.
Closely related to our model is an empirical factor model using panel data on earnings
whose use was pioneered by Jim Heckman through a series of papers with diverse coauthors.
The rst objective of this research was to restrict the set of joint distributions of two or more
potential outcomes. If these outcomes are selectively observed such as in the case of a binary
treatment, their joint distribution albeit not identiable in the generic case becomes identied in
the linear factor case. Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) makes this point in a general Roy
model using one factor and Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) extends it to the multiple
factor case. Furthermore, this setting allows to address the issue of discriminating between
heterogeneity from uncertainty in educational decisions (Cunha, Heckman and Navarro, 2007)
and to investigate the empirics of skill formation (Cunha and Heckman, 2008). Finally, Cunha,
Heckman and Schennach (2010) extends these results and results from Schennach (2004) to a
non linear factor set up and show how non parametric estimates of moments of latent variables
can be constructed from various measurements of these variables using empirical characteristic
functions and inverse Fourier transforms.
In our factor model, factors are known. Arellano and Bonhomme (2010) look in detail to the
identication of the distribution of individual e¤ects or factor loadings when the time dimension
is xed and show that its variance is identied under restrictions of the dynamics. They also
propose the construction of non parametric estimates for the distribution of the individual factor
loadings. That factors are known is in contrast with Bai (2009) who derives MLE estimates in
factor models in which the time factors are unknown and in the presence of covariates. In contrast
to the linear factor approach we adopt, deconvolution methods might also be an interesting
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but more arduous route to follow. Horowitz and Markatou (1996) estimate semi-parametrically
the distributions of idiosyncratic terms and individual e¤ects. However, in their approach the
dynamic dimension has to be restricted to be AR(1). Geweke and Keane (1998) and Hirano
(2002) generalized the model in the same direction by implementing a Bayesian approach to
estimate posterior distributions of the parameters. Bonhomme and Robin (2010) construct an
estimator of the distribution of factors using empirical characteristic functions and apply this
estimator to analyze the distributions of permanent and transitory components of earnings using
the PSID i.e. in a random growth setting.
Finally, general equilibrium e¤ects with microeconomic foundations is another direction taken
in the literature. Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) were among the rst to model human
capital investments at school and later in life in a dynamic and stochastic general equilibrium
set-up. This allows them to estimate the e¤ects on inequality of counterfactual productivity
shocks. In the recent literature, Guvenen and Kuruscu (2012) analyze as well the e¤ect of
skill biased technical change on inequality in an equilibrium set-up with heterogeneous agents
investing in human capital. This is also the object of Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011) who
use such a microeconomic model calibrated on the US PSID data to decompose inequality into
their long-run individual determinants and short-run shocks, the latter resulting to be the larger
component of variance. The previous literature on this theme is reviewed in these two last
papers.
3 The Model
We present a model of human capital investment in discrete time and in which agents face
individual specic costs, individual specic rates of return and individual specic terminal values
of human capital stocks. As in Ben Porath (1967) and Mincer (1974), we characterize the
optimal sequence of human capital investments over the life cycle. The key new point is that the
reduced form of the life cycle earnings equation is a log-linear factor model with three factors
whose factor loadings are in relation with the individual specic structural determinants. We
analyze the transformation between parameters of the reduced and structural forms and the
ensuing structural restrictions on factor loadings.
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3.1 The set up
Individuals enter the labor market at a period which is normalized to t = 1. The entry decision
in the labour market is endogenous and depends on previous human capital accumulation. We
take, however, these initial conditions as given and depending on unobserved variables, among
which the human capital stock at entry. These initial conditions are potentially correlated with
all shocks a¤ecting the life-cycle dynamics of earnings.
From period 1 onwards, agents can acquire human capital through part-time training. Human
capital is supposed to be single-dimensional so that skills are general and costs are borne by
the workers. Labor supply is inelastic and potential individuals earnings, yPi (t) are given by
an individual-specic stock of human capital, Hi(t), times an individual specic rental rate,
exp(i(t)) that is yPi (t) = exp(i(t))Hi(t): Individuals face uncertainty through the variability
of the rental rate of human capital i(t) which is mainly a¤ected by aggregate shocks but also
by individual ones if there are some frictions in the labor market. Firms might temporarily
value individual specic human capital di¤erently than the market in order to attract, retain or
discourage specic individuals. The rental rate is supposed to follow a stochastic process and
i(t) is fully revealed at period t to the agent. We do not provide a market analysis of the wage
equilibrium process and take it as given (in terms of its distribution).
By substracting human capital investments, current individual earnings are assumed to be
given by:
yi(t) = exp(i(t))Hi(t) exp(  i(t))
where 1   exp(  i(t)) can be interpreted as the fraction of working time devoted to investing
in human capital as in the original Ben Porath formulation. It might also be interpreted as the
level of e¤ort put in the acquisition of human capital at the cost of losing a fraction of potential
earnings. We call,  i(t), somewhat abusively the level of investment in human capital at time t
and actual earnings are equal to potential earnings when  i(t) = 0. There is no upper bound on
 i(t) although an innite investment value would mean that the individual has not yet entered
the labor market.
Because of these investments, individuals accumulate human capital in a way that is described
by the following equation
Hi(t+ 1) = Hi(t) exp[i i(t)  i(t)] (1)
whereHi(t) is the stock of human capital, i an individual specic rate of return of human capital
investments and i(t) is the depreciation of human capital in period t. This latter component
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embeds individual-specic shocks or innovations at the economy level as these innovations de-
preciate previous vintages of human capital. Individual-specic shocks can be negative because
of unemployment periods or of layo¤s followed by mobility across sectors. These shocks can
also be positive when certain components of human capital acquire more value or because of
voluntary moves across rms or sectors. As i(t); the variable i(t) is supposed to be revealed
at period t to the agent and is uncertain before. We also take the stochastic process i(t) as a
given.2
The next step is to formulate a utility ow and the way individuals move assets across time.
In order to generate the popular log-linear specication for the earnings equation, we assume
that period t utility is equal to current log earnings net of investment costs so that there is no
consumption smoothing over time.3 Period-t utility is written as :
i(t) + log Hi(t) 

 i(t) + ci
 i(t)
2
2

in which ci represent between-individual di¤erences in the cost of human capital accumulation
in utility terms and the cost is quadratic. Note that the coe¢ cient of  i(t) is set to 1 because it
corresponds to the standard formulation of Ben Porath (1967) in which the objective function
would be a function of current earnings or their logarithm only :4
i(t) + log Hi(t)   i(t): (2)
Quadratic costs adds richness to the setting and it ts well with the interpretation of  i(t)
in terms of e¤ort exerted for human capital investments and not only time as in the simple
specication. Quadratic costs makes the solution in  i(t) unique (see below).
Nonetheless, the costs of investments do not depend on the level of human capital Hi(t) as
in a Ben Porath setting in which equation (1) would include a non linear term Hi(t) instead
of setting  = 1 as we do. This is in fact another way of making the solution  i(t) uniquely
determined. Furthermore, our specication avoids the "regression to the mean" e¤ect emphasized
by Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2006) that makes individuals closer and closer at the end of
2We shall also assume additional technical assumptions such as Et h(ji(t)j) < 1 and Et h(ji(t)j) < 1 so
that the dynamic program is well dened. For the sake of readability these standard assumptions are not stated
here (see Stokey and Lucas, 1989).
3Our conjecture is that there does not exist a dynamic model with nancial and human capital accumulation
that would generate a log-earnings equation if the nancial asset accumulation equation is written linearly in
income. In contrast, there does exist a dynamic model which generates a factor-like earnings equation in levels,
allows both nancial and human capital and has a factor format. This case is developed in a companion paper.
4We investigated the case in which the linear cost parameter is left free and this parameter is di¢ cult to
separately identify from i and ci (see also below).
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their working life. Moreover, Section 7 proposes a convenient generalization of our setting to the
case of increasing costs of investment with the level of human capital. It comes at the price of
having additional factors in the econometric model.
Returning to the main argument, the decision program of individuals maximizing their dis-
counted expected utility stream over the present and future is given by the following Bellman
equation:
Vt(Hi(t);  i(t)) = i(t) + logHi(t) 

 i(t) + ci
 i(t)
2
2

+ Et [Wt+1(Hi(t+ 1))] (3)
in which  is the discount factor and:
Wt+1(Hi(t+ 1)) = Vt+1(Hi(t+ 1); 

i (t+ 1)) = max
 i(t+1)
Vt+1(Hi(t+ 1);  i(t+ 1)):
This dynamic program is completed by a terminal condition that at a future date T + 1 the
value function or the discounted value of utility stream from T + 1 onwards is given by:
WT+1(Hi(T + 1)) = 
 + i logHi(T + 1): (4)
In this expression, i can be interpreted as the capitalized value of one euro over the remaining
period of life after T + 1 and:
i = 1 + T+2 + T+3 + :::
in which discount rates t vary with period t and embody heterogenous survival probabilities
after T + 1. If we assume that discount factors t>T+1   e.g. t>T+1 =  Pr(Survival at t)
then :
i  1
1   : (5)
This suggests that a general interpretation of period T + 1 is as a separating date between a
span of periods before T in which the probability of survival is equal to 1 and a span of periods
after T + 1 in which the survival probability is less than one.5 As human capital investments
are embodied, a smaller discount rate is a source of decreasing returns to investment as in the
original argument used by Mincer and this explains the concavity of earnings proles.
3.2 The life-cycle prole of investments
When human capital investments are always positive, the prole of investments is summarized
in:
5As we will see in the empirical section, we x the value of  at .95 because of weak identication issues. As
usual in empirical dynamic models, experiments show that the likelihood function is at wrt to this parameter.
This also explains why we do not make this parameter individual specic and assume that it is homogenous.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that :
ii > 1; (6)
then:
 i(t) =
1
ci

i


1   + 
T+1 t(i   1
1   )

  1

> 0; 8t < T + 1 (7)
Proof. See Appendix A.1
Equation (7) expresses the well known result that human capital investments decrease with
time. The term in  t indeed means that it is always better to invest earlier than later because
the horizon over which investments are valuable is becoming smaller and smaller. This is the
negative value of i  11  (condition 5) that commands the intensity of the decrease. In addition,
levels of investments increase with returns, i, and decrease with costs, ci. Finally, condition (6)
ensures that investments as given by equation (7) are positive until period T .
It is now easy to analyze cases in which investments in human capital stop before period
T . Because investments are decreasing, the absence of investments in a period t,  i(t) = 0;
means that no investments would take place later on,  i(t0) = 0; 8t0  t. In consequence, we
can proceed backwards and analyze the conditions under which human capital investments stop
before the last period.
Proposition 2 There exists an optimal stopping period for human capital investments denoted
Si 2 f1; :; T + 1g so that :
8t  Si; t < T + 1;  i(t) = 0; and  i(Si   1) > 0
if and only if:
1
i;Si
< i 
1
i;Si+1
; (8)
where i;T = i and it = 1+i;t+1 for all t < T +1 (and by convention 1i;T+1 = +1; 1i;1 = 0).
Additionally, equation (7) describing human capital investments remains valid for all t < Si.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
Because, the sequence it of the previous proposition is given by:
Lemma 3 For all t 2 (1; T + 1) :
it =
1
1   + 
T t(i   1
1   ) (9)
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Proof. Using denitions in Proposition 2 and by backward induction from T:
we can summarize the two propositions into the following:
Corollary 4 There exists Si 2 f1; :; T + 1g such that:
1
i;Si 1
< i 
1
i;Si
;
and:
 i(t) =
1
ci

i


1   + 
Si t(i;Si  
1
1   )

  1

> 0; 8t < Si:
Proof. From Proposition 2, human capital investments stop at period Si. We can then use
equations (7) and (9).
This corollary proves that the prole of life-cycle investments is truncated at zero but there
are no dynamic e¤ects of the truncation. The prole remains similar even if investments stop.
This corollary also shows that if we had information about the duration of the sequence of human
capital investments, we would be able to relate this information to parameters i and i only. In
particular, note that the cost parameter, ci, does not a¤ect this duration and only the level of
investments. This is a strong prediction of our set-up and this is due to the separability between
investment costs and human capital stocks.
3.3 The Lifecycle Prole of Earnings
We start by deriving the earnings prole when human capital investments remain positive until
period T . First, the stock of human capital in period t depends on previous investment choices
and past depreciation that is
Hi(t) = Hi(1) exp
"
t 1X
l=1
i i(l) 
t 1X
l=1
i(l)
#
for t  2:
We can write the logarithm of observed earnings in period t as
log yi(t) = i(t) + log Hi(1) +
t 1X
l=1
i i(l) 
t 1X
l=1
i(l)   i(t): (10)
It shows that returns to human capital i(t) cannot be distinguished from depreciation e¤ectsPt 1
l=1 i(l) and we will therefore write that transitory earnings are equal to:
yi (t) = i(t) 
t 1X
l=1
i(l):
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Furthermore, inserting into the rst sum the structural expression for  i() given by equation
(7) we get :
E
t 1X
l=1
i i(l) =
2i
ci
t 1X
l=1


1   + 
T+1 l(i   1
1   )

  i
ci
(t  1);
=
2i
ci

1   (t  1) +
2i
ci
(i   1
1   )
T
t 1X
l=1
1 l   i
ci
(t  1)
=

2i
ci

1    
i
ci

(t  1) + 
2
i
ci
(i   1
1   )
T 1  (1=)t 1
1  1=
=  
2
i
ci
(i   1
1   )
T+1
1   +

2i
ci

1    
i
ci

(t  1)
+
2i
ci
(i   1
1   )
T+2
1  
 t;
which writes as the sum of three factors whereas one factor is in levels, the second one is a linear
trend and the last one is a geometric trend.
Finally, using equation (7):
 i(t) =
1
ci

i

1     1

+
i
ci
T+1(i   1
1   )
 t
and rearranging expression (10) we have the following reduced form expression for log earnings
log yi(t) = i1 + i2t+ i3
 t + yi (t); (11)
in which:
i1 = logHi(1) 
2i
ci

i   1
1  

T+2
1    
i + 1
ci

i

1     1

; (12)
i2 =
2i
ci

1    
i
ci
; (13)
i3 =
2i
ci

i   1
1  

T+2
1    
i
ci
T+1(i   1
1   ): (14)
From these reduced form equations, it is clear that di¤erent permanent and transitory factors
contribute to individual earnings trajectories. On the one hand, three types of permanent het-
erogeneities drive earnings dynamics. Firstly, di¤erences in initial capital investment at school,
Hi(1), lead to permanent di¤erences in log earnings. Secondly, between-individual di¤erences in
marginal return to investment, i, and in the cost parameter ci make earnings growth rates indi-
vidual specic. Thirdly, the interaction between the marginal return and the cost of investment,
i=ci, makes earnings proles di¤er in amplitude. We shall look below at the form of transitory
earnings.
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In the case in which human capital investments stop before period T , the previous results
can be adapted by replacing period T + 1 by period Si as developed in Corollary 4. This a¤ects
the denitions of the factors (i1; i2; i3) as derived in equations (12) to (14) although it does
not a¤ect the form of the earnings equation (11) before and including period Si 1. Nonetheless
after period Si; human capital investments are equal to zero and the earnings equation (11) is
derived by using potential earnings and the accumulation equation:
log yi(t) = i(t) + log Hi(t); log Hi(t+ 1) = log Hi(t)  i(t);8t  Si
so that we have:
log yi(t+ 1) = log yi(t) + i(t+ 1)  i(t)  i(t): (15)
Earnings growth becomes stochastic and is no longer determined by the terms i2 and i3.
An interesting conclusion of these theoretical developments is therefore that the two most
popular specications, the heterogeneous growth and random walk ones, are both predicted by
the theoretical model although not concurrently but as a sequence in the working life of each
worker. As long as human capital investments are positive the heterogeneous growth specication
applies. It is only when investments stop that the random walk hypothesis becomes the rule.
We shall assume in the empirical section, for want of better identication, that the econometric
model is given by the heterogeneous growth model and equation (11) so that investments in
human capital are positive until the last period of observation T: Next section shows that this
condition is testable. If this condition were not true, the earnings equation would be a mixture
between a generalized random growth model (11) and a random walk (15) and identication
would rely on specic distributional assumptions (see below).
3.4 From the Reduced to the Structural Forms
The structural model not only imposes a three-factor structure on the reduced form but it also
imposes restrictions on reduced-form parameters, (i1; i2; i3). In addition, the transformation
formulas between reduced and structural forms help recovering the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity structural components. We answer in this section two questions. Do restrictions
on structural parameters and this system of equations imply any restrictions on the reduced
form parameters? Second, are structural parameters identied?
First, equation (12) which describes unobserved heterogeneity in levels in earnings equations
allows us to identify the level of initial human capital if the other individual specic terms are
xed. It thus imposes no constraint.
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The other equations (13) and (14) are more interesting and can be rewritten as:
i2 =
i
ci

i

1     1

; (16)
i3 =
i
ci
T+1(i   1
1   )

i

1     1

: (17)
This is a non linear system of two equations with three unknowns: i; ci and i so that parameters
are underidentied. Some structural restrictions can nevertheless be binding.
Namely, structural restrictions consist in statements about the lower discount factor after
period T + 1 and about costs and returns parameters i.e.:
i 2 [0; 1
1   ]; ci > 0; i > 0: (18)
As developed at the end of the previous section, we shall also impose that human capital invest-
ments remain positive so that:
 i(t) > 0 for all t  T: (19)
We can now summarize reduced-from restrictions and the identication of structural parameters
as:
Proposition 5 Structural restrictions (18) and (19) imply the following restrictions on reduced
form parameters :
i2 > 0;
i3
i2
2 [  
T+1
1   ; 0]:
Parameter i is identied and:
i =
1
1   + 
 (T+1)i3
i2
:
Furthermore, parameters (i; ci) are partially identied in the sense that there exists values
(Li ; c
L
i ) such that
i  Li ; ci  cLi :
and there exits a one-to-one relationship:
ci = c(i; i2; i3):
Proof. See Appendix A.3
Its interpretation is intuitive. The random growth parameter i2 is positive because human
capital investments are productive and the curvature term i3 is negative because the horizon is
nite and proles are concave. It is also this curvature relative to the random growth term, and
therefore the implicit horizon over which investments are valued, which identies the capitalized
value of future returns to human capital after period T + 1.
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3.5 Transitory earnings
In equation (11), transitory earnings yi (t) are due to individual specic and aggregate shocks,
i(t) net of human capital depreciations, i(t). To this we add measurement errors  i(t) to
obtain that random shocks are described by:
yi (t) = i(t) 
t 1X
l=s
i(l) +  i(t):
Even if measurement errors are independent over time, the e¤ects of the rst two transitory
components may persist across periods and generates autocorrelation in the earnings residuals.
Indeed, the deviation of the rate of return i(t) from the market rental rate is due to individual
specic factors and the match each worker forms with a specic rm. This is likely to persist over
time. Depreciation factors included in
Pt 1
l=0 i(l) are highly persistent if i(t) is independent
over time. It indeed generates a random walk if i(t) is iid over time. Nevertheless it needs
not be so if
Pt 1
l=0 i(l) is stationary, that is that depreciation shocks are partly compensated
in the future. Layo¤ shocks that force agents to change sectors might be an example of a long
persistence in these factors. In order to identify the individual specic parameters s, we shall
impose in the econometric model, a period-heteroskedastic ARMA structure on these shocks
though alternatives such as factor structures might be an interesting route to explore.
Another interpretation stems from a model of search and mobility. Indeed what Postel-
Vinay and Turon (2010) nicely explicit in their presentation is that the dynamics of the earnings
process is partly controled by two other processes which are individual productivity in the current
match and outside o¤ers that the agent receives while on the job. In this setting, three things can
happen: either earnings remain in the band within the two bounds dened by these processes;
or the earnings is equal to the productivity process because adverse shocks on that process
make employee and employer renegociate the wage contract; or alternatively, the wage is equal
to the outside o¤er in the case the employee can either renegociate with his employer or take
the outside o¤er if the productivity is lower that the outside option. We do not impose these
structural constraints in this paper and we treat them as an element of idiosyncratic shocks.
Next section describes how we deal with estimation and inference in this model of the earnings
formation process.
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4 Econometric Modelling of earnings Dynamics
In this section we state our empirical and estimation strategy and details our arguments for the
steps we use.
The rst key high-level assumption is our choice of estimating the generalized random growth
model as given by earnings equation (11) only. It corresponds to estimating parameters of
earnings proles under the null hypothesis that investments are positive until the end of the
period of observation. This assumption is one of our structural restrictions and is testable. One
reason to proceed this way is that it seems di¢ cult to identify the model under the alternative
hypothesis unless one is ready to adopt more parametric assumptions for individual heterogeneity
terms. The alternative would indeed imply that the data generating process is a random mixture
between a random growth model and a random walk model where the random mixture depends
on the value of individual heterogeneity terms. We leave these developments for future research.
Our second key assumption consists in xing the discount rate at a value equal to 0.95. This
solves the identication issue that we face in decomposing empirical variances and covariances
of log earnings over time into the e¤ects of the individual specic factors and the e¤ects of the
idiosyncratic error terms. Arellano and Bonhomme (2010) shows that along with a nite lag
specication assumption about the ARMA process, this assumption is su¢ cient to get identi-
cation. Experiments that we performed in simpler identically and independent settings indeed
seemed to indicate that the discount rate parameter is not well identied.
Furthermore, we adopt a strategy in two steps. We rst specify a model that is estimable
by random e¤ect methods and specically, we use the pseudo-likelihood estimator suggested
by Alvarez and Arellano (2004). Under a normality assumption, the implicit moment selection
underlying this estimation method is optimal and though the method loses optimality in the
general case, it is still useful for moment selection and for small-sample bias reduction. Though
we recover consistent estimates of covariance matrices of individual e¤ects and transitory idio-
syncratic terms, using those estimates to impose restrictions, derive structural estimates and
compute counterfactuals is computationally di¢ cult. One route would be to use deconvolution
techniques although it would require the development of estimation under structural constraints
on distributions.
As a simpler next step, we chose to turn to xed e¤ects estimation which is simple to
implement when covariance matrix estimates are known or estimated in the previous random
e¤ect step. These xed e¤ect estimates are admittedly biased if the time span is not long enough
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since the order of the bias is 1=T . Nonetheless we show that for individuals observed over a
su¢ ciently long time period, the bias is empirically of a second order magnitude by comparing
variance estimates across xed and random e¤ect specications. Using xed e¤ect estimates,
structural restrictions become easily testable and estimates of the reduced-form parameters under
structural constraints are easily computed. Yet, these constrained parameters are likely to be at
the frontier of these structural restrictions and because the frontier structural parameters are
implausible in economic terms, we adopt a simulated approach to draw more plausible estimates
of the structural parameters. We directly draw those estimates into the normal approximation
of the asymptotic distribution of the xed e¤ect estimates. The last leg of our empirical strategy
is to compute counterfactuals by changing the values of those structural parameters.
In Section 4.1, we specify the covariance structure implied by the reduced form earnings
equation (11) and the time-heteroskedastic ARMA assumption that we adopt for transitory
earnings. We estimate covariance parameters by random e¤ect methods using the pseudo-
likelihood approach as explained in Section 4.2 and then turn to xed e¤ect estimation and the
imposition of structural constraints. We end this section with the computation of counterfactuals.
4.1 Model Specication
Equation (11) can be written as a three-factor model with factor loadings, i = (i1; i2; i3) :
log(yit) = i1 + i2t+ i3
1
t
+ yi (t) for any t = 1; :; T: (20)
We follow the literature and take deviations from the mean of log(yit) using the nest groupings
that are observed in the data as a function of age of entry, skill level and time, say:
log(yit) = E(log(yit) j i 2 g) + uit:
Denote gk = E(ik j i 2 g) for k = 1; 2 or 3 and the centered individual e¤ects as:
cik = ik   gk if i 2 g;
so that equation (20) becomes:
uit = 
c
i1 + 
c
i2t+ 
c
i3
1
t
+ vit for any t = 1; :; T; (21)
which is the equation of interest in the random e¤ect estimation below. It will also be useful to
remember the between group equation:
E(log(yit) j i 2 g) = g1 + g2t+ g3
1
t
+ E(yi (t) j i 2 g)
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which allows the identication of the group means of (i1; i2; i3) under a restriction on group
and period specic e¤ects E(yi (t) j i 2 g): Estimates of these quantities will be used in the xed
e¤ect estimation of the is.
On the one hand, our main parameters of interest are factor loadings in equation (21). On
the other hand, we specify the stochastic process followed by the shock vit as a "reduced-form"
process. Its variances and autocovariances are given by an ARMA structure whose order is
known in advance with the additional feature of period heteroskedasticity. Similar specications
of the dependence structure are developed in Alvarez and Arellano (2004), Guvenen (2009) and
Arellano and Bonhomme (2010). We dene vit as
vit = 1vi(t 1) + :::+ pvi(t p) + twit;
where wit is MA(q):
wit =  it    1 it 1   :::   q it q:
Whereas alternatives could be the composition of permanent and transitory shocks (Bonhomme
and Robin, 2009) or general factor models (Bai, 2009), we chose ARMA models in order to easily
test for the presence of any non stationary elements in those stochastics.
4.2 Random E¤ect Estimation
Redening the time index accordingly, we shall assume that initial conditions of the process
(ui(1 p); :; ui0) are observed. The dynamic process is thus a function of the random variables
zi = (vi(1 p); :; vi0;  i(1 q); :;  iT ) which collect initial conditions of the autoregressive process
(vi(1 p); :; vi0); initial conditions of the moving average process ( i(1 q); :;  i0) and the idiosyncratic
shocks a¤ecting random shocks between 1 and T . We write the quasi-likelihood of the sample
using a multivariate normal distribution
zi  N(0;
z)
The structure of 
z structure is detailed in Appendix B although it can be summarized eas-
ily. The correlations between initial conditions and individual e¤ects are not constrained, while
innovations  it are supposed orthogonal to any previous terms including initial conditions. How-
ever, the initial conditions (vi(1 p); :; vi0) can be correlated with previous shocks as  i0; :;  i(1 q).
As for the individual e¤ects (ci1; 
c
i2; 
c
i3) we assume that they are independent of the idio-
syncratic shocks  i(1 q); :;  iT while they can be correlated with the initial conditions of the
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autoregressive process (vi(1 p); :; vi0) in an unrestricted way. From these restrictions it is possible
to build the covariance matrix of the observed variables
V ui = (ui(1 p); :; ui0; ui1; :; uiT )  
u:
This covariance matrix, 
u; is a function of the parameters of the model that are the autoregress-
ive parameters fkgk=1;:::;p; the moving average parameters f kgk=1;:::;q; the covariance matrix
(conditional on groups) of c, ; the heteroskedastic components ftgt=1;:::;T and the covariance
of xed e¤ects and initial conditions,  0 (see Appendix B).
A pseudo likelihood interpretation can always be given to this specication. As in Alvarez
and Arellano (2004), the estimates remain consistent under the much weaker assumption that:
E( it j i; ut 1i ) = 0;
although optimality properties of such an estimation method are derived under the normality
assumptions only.
The pseudo likelihood setting is particularly well adapted to the case in which there are
mssing data in earnings dynamics. In the case of GMM estimation procedures, we would have
to rewrite each moment condition in which there are missing data by replacing the missing
variables by their expressions as a function of observed variables. This is untractable in such a
dataset in which the number of di¤erent missing structures is very large while this is handled
with parsimony in a pseudo likelihood setting. For any missing data conguration, it consists
in deleting the rows and columns of the covariance matrix corresponding to missing data and
write the likelihood function accordingly. Random e¤ect estimates remain consistent if data are
missing at random.
4.3 Fixed E¤ect Estimates
It is not possible to impose structural constraints on parameters at the estimation stage in the
random e¤ect model. It is nonetheless useful to use random e¤ect estimates in order to construct
xed e¤ect estimates of individual factor loadings in a second step. In a log likelihood framework,
we obtain xed e¤ect estimates as linear combinations of residuals, the linear combinations being
given by the covariance matrix estimated in the random e¤ect model. Appendix C.1 develops
the corresponding analytic computations that lead to dene the individual e¤ects estimates as:
^ci = B^u
[1 p;T ]
i :
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in which matrix B is a function of random e¤ect parameters and B^ its plug-in estimate.
The bias for the estimated variance of earnings can be computed as in Arellano and Bon-
homme (2010). To abstract rst from sampling errors, an unfeasible estimate is naturally dened
as:
~ci = Bu
[1 p;T ]
i = 
c
i +Bw
[1 p;T ]
i ;
in which random vector w[1 p;T ]i has mean zero and covariance matrix, 
w whose expression is
computed in Appendix C.1. We have :
V (~ci) = EV (~
c
i j ci) + V E(~ci j ci)
=) V (~ci) = B
wB0 + V (ci):
The bias term is given by B
wB0 and it is easy to show that the dominating term is of order
1=T .6
Our estimate has an additional bias term which is given by the measurement equation:
^ci = B^u
[1 p;T ]
i = ~
c
i + (B^  B)w[1 p;T ]i ;
although this term is in 1=
p
N and thus dominated in large N and moderate T samples by
the bias in 1=T . Note that these biases can be estimated and bias-corrected estimates of those
variance terms can be constructed. We shall evaluate them in the empirical section below.
4.4 Constraints and Structural Parameters
From those individual-specic estimates, we now show how to impose the structural constraints
derived in Proposition 5. If those constraints are satised, structural individual specic estimates
can be derived from xed e¤ect estimates.
Indeed, estimates ^i do not necessarily satisfy the constraints:
i2 > 0 and
i3
i2
2 [  
T+1
1   ; 0]:
We let T =
T+1
1  and write these contraints as:
i2 > 0; i3 < 0 and i3 + Ti2 > 0:
As we know the asymptotic distribution of each factor loadings, we can test each single restriction
at the individual level.
6Because our factors are a constant, a linear trend and a geometric one, there are also bias terms in 1=T 2 and
exp( T ) that are dominated by the leading one, 1=T .
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Furthermore, we can construct constrained estimates by projecting unconstrained estimates
on the set of restrictions using the distance dened by the (log)-likelihood function criteria
as explained in Appendix C.3. We have to reintroduce rst the estimates of individual e¤ect
averages i.e.:
^i = g + ^
c
i if i 2 g
We can then construct the distribution of the distance in the data between the unconstrained
and the constrained estimates, ^Ri :
d(^Ri ; ^i) = (^
R
i   ^i)0
^ 1 (^Ri   ^i);
which is the basis for a Quasi-Likelihood Ratio test of all structural restrictions (e.g. Silvapulle
and Sen, 2005). The distribution of this statistic under the null hypothesis is a mixture of
chi-square distributions and we evaluate this distribution by simulation in the empirical section
below.
Nevertheless, constrained estimates are on the frontier of structural restrictions by construc-
tion when the unconstrained estimates are outside the set of structural constraints. This happens
quite often even when the null hypothesis is true and when the number of observed periods Ti is
small. For instance, it could be that constrained estimates verify the constraint, i3 +Ti2 = 0;
which would mean that the estimate of parameter i is equal to 0: Because i > 1=i, this
would generate an implausible large estimate for i.
This is why we use simulation to sample into the asymptotic distribution of constrained
estimates. We use that the likelihood function of an individual earnings prole is given by:
L(ci j u[1 p;T ]i ) = H(u[1 p;T ]i ): exp

 1
2
(ci  Bu[1 p;T ]i )0
 1 (ci  Bu[1 p;T ]i )

L0(
c
i);
in which structural restrictions are implicitly stated in the prior distribution L0(ci). We draw
into this posterior distribution to construct simulated constrained estimates, ^si , of i using the
developments in Appendix C.4. Some additional trimming to avoid frontier points is used.
4.5 Counterfactuals
We want to analyze the impact of a change in the levels of the terminal capitalization rate i or
in the rate of return i for instance. Other parameters will remain xed since it would require a
proper modelling or specic assumptions. This applies in particular to the initial level of human
capital as well as to the rental price of human capital over time which will assumed constant
across these experiments. It is fair to note that counterfactuals we construct are independent of
these variables only under restrictions that we state below.
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4.5.1 Survival probabilities
We assume that there is a "technological" improvement in survival probabilities in such a way
that there are additional K years after period T during which the survival probability remains
equal to 1 (instead of starting declining). This amounts to the transformation of i into i :
i  
1
1   = 
K(i   1
1   )
as if we were prolonging, all of a sudden, life expectancy by K years. Other parameters i and
ci are held xed.
We evaluate the consequences on the earnings proles of these changes as if these news had
been revealed at time t = 1 so that the initial level of human capital would remain the same. We
assume that there is innite demand for human capital at the rental prices that were e¤ectively
observed and we assume that decumulation shocks remain the same so that the transitory
earnings process also remains the same.
Evaluating equations (12) to (14) at the new values (i ; i; ci; Hi(1)) demonstrate that the
new values (1i; 

2i; 

3i) are such that 

2i = 2i, 

i3 = 
Ki3 and that:
i1   i1 =  
2i
ci

i   1
1  

T+2
1   (
K   1): (22)
In order to abstract from the idiosyncratic noise of transitory earnings which is supposed to
remain xed, we shall then compare the earnings variance prole V (M()i ) with the original
prole of V (M()i):
Nonetheless, parameters i and ci in equation (22) are not identied and only a lower bound
(Li ; c
L
i ) on their values can be computed. We shall then proceed by making di¤erent assumptions
like i = 
L
i ; 
L
i = 1:20i etc to assess the robustness of this construction.
4.5.2 Human capital technology
The construction of counterfactuals for the human capital technology is more speculative. Since
only a lower bound for rates of returns can be identied, experiments for constructing counter-
factuals led to very large bounds. It is thus fair to say that those specic counterfactuals are
not identied. As mentioned earlier, one possible route would be to use parametric assumptions
for structural parameters in order to identify rates of return and consequently counterfactuals
involving these rates.
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5 Descriptive Analysis of the Data
5.1 Sample Selection
Our panel dataset on earnings is extracted from a French administrative source named Déclar-
ations Annuelles de Données Sociales (DADS). DADS data is collected through a mandatory
data requirement (by French law) for social security and tax verication purposes. All employers
must send to the social security and tax administrations the list of all persons who have been
employed in their establishments during the year. Firms report the full earnings they have paid
to each person but this does not include other wage costs borne by the rm. Each person is
identied by a unique individual social security number which facilitates the follow-up of indi-
viduals through time although it is impossible to reconstruct taxes they pay. The tax system is
household-based in France and the linking of this dataset with scal records is not authorized
yet.
The French National Statistical Institute (INSEE) has been drawing a sample from this
dataset at a sampling rate of 4% since 1976. Regarding the sampling device, all individuals who
were born in October of even years should be included in this sample. Nevertheless, there are two
main reasons why observations can be missing. First, data were not collected in three years (1981,
1983 and 1990) for reasons specic to INSEE. Second, this dataset is restricted to individuals
employed in the private sector or in publicly-owned companies only. As a consequence, this
analysis is restricted to individuals who have been employed at least one year between 1976 and
2007 in the private sector or in a publicly-owned company.
In addition, we aim at keeping only employees with a permanent full-time attachment to the
private sector. Firstly, we considered persons employed full time only and censor information
about part-time jobs. We also restricted the sample to men entering the labor market in 1977
and working in the private sector in 1978, 1982 and 1984 to avoid non-participation and also
because the bulk of entries as a public servant occurs at the beginning of the working life. The
denition of entry here is the same as in Le Minez and Roux (2002). We consider that an
individual has entered the labor market as soon as this individual has occupied the same job for
more than 6 months and is still employed the following year, possibly in a di¤erent rm. The
date of entry denes the cohort to which the individual belongs and we focus on a single cohort
of entrants in 1977, the rst year of our panel which lasts until 2007.
We impose these restrictions in order to concentrate on a relatively homogeneous sample of
workers with a long term attachment to the labor market to which private rms have access.
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Admittedly, it does not represent the full working population. Because of the lack of a cred-
ible identication strategy to correct for selection, we shall assume that selection is at random
or can be conditioned on individual-specic e¤ects only. The distribution functions of unob-
served factor loadings or idiosyncratic components that we estimate in the following refer to this
subpopulation.
The empirical analysis uses "annualized" earnings. It is dened as full earnings divided by
the number of days worked and remultiplied by the average annual workload. In order to weaken
the possible impact of measurement error, we coded as missing the rst and last percentiles of
the earnings distribution in every period. A shortcoming of using administrative data is that few
observable characteristics are available apart from a rough measure of age at labor market entry
and a rough measure of education grouping the rst job into three categories. As a measure of
skill, we can also use a grouping given by the age of entry. The rst group includes individuals
entering the labor market when they are less than 20 years old, the second group of individuals
enters between age 20 and 23 and the last group after age 24.
We analyze deviations of log earnings with respect to the mean log earnings of workers within
the same age of entry and education group at each point in time. That is, we compute earnings
residuals, uit as in equation (21):
uit = log(yit)  log(yit)gt, for i 2 g = 1; :; G
in which g is the index of groups formed by age of entry and education.
5.2 Earnings Inequality in France Over the Period
As regard earnings inequalities in France, a few recent studies investigate their evolution over
roughly the same period as our data. First and foremost, wage dispersion in France has not
increased over the last thirty years in contrast with the US or the UK (Mo¢ t and Gottschalk,
2008, Dickens, 2000). It represents an important distinction from previous studies mostly using
US data that one should keep in mind.
Charnoz, Coudin and Gaini (2011) use quantile regressions using the same DADS data on
full time private sector earnings. They show that earnings inequality in France has been rather
stable from 1976 to 1992 and has been slightly decreasing from 1995 to 2004. They point out the
important role of the natural replacement of older cohorts by younger ones and the large part
played by several increases in the minimum wage over the period. Cornilleau (2012) uses the
same data set and looks at changes in means and dispersion of earnings from the nineteen sixties
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to 2004. This author concludes to a slight decrease in inequality that balances two counteracting
e¤ects. A reduction in inequality at the bottom of the distribution (the ratio of the minimum
wage over the median increasing from 51 to 66%) was slightly mitigated by a small increase in
dispersion in the upper part of the distribution (the ratio of median wage to the limit of the last
decile decreasing from 52 to 50%). In a di¤erent vein, Verdugo (2012) relates changes in the
wage structure with changes in educational attainment using various datasets. He concludes to
a reduction in wage inequality in the lower part of the distribution and a stable dispersion in
the upper part.
A nal note of caution is in order. While these studies consider changes in the cross-sectional
wage distributions, we adopt in this paper a di¤erent perspective by following a single cohort of
individuals entering the labor market in 1977. Changes in the structure of the population that
has been given a large role by the previous studies are neutralized in this paper.
5.3 Data description
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the sample. The sample size is 7446 observations in
1977 and 4670 in 2007. Age of entry groups dened above are of unequal size, the low skill
group being the largest. Attrition follows a somewhat irregular pattern which is partly due in
the rst years to our sampling design since we required that wage earners be present in 1977,
1978, 1982 and 1984. Some years are also completely missing (1981, 1983 and 1990). There are
also more surprising features for instance in 1994 (or 2003 at a lesser degree) a year in which
many observations are missing. This is due to the way INSEE reconstructed the data from the
information in the original les and missing data patterns in 1994 are very similar across age of
entry groups.
To complete this information, Table 2 gives a dynamic view of attrition. This Table reports
the frequencies of reported values by pairs of years. For instance, the column 1977, describes the
global features of attrition. Attrition is quite severe in the rst "normal" (after selection) year,
1985 since 15% of individuals exit between 1984 and 1985. This is true in every adjacent years
at the beginning of the sample period (other columns for instance in cell 1987, 1988) but it is
decreasing over time to reach 7 or 8% at the end of the panel. Year 1994 conrms its exceptional
status as attrition between 1994 and 1995 is very low. More generally though, most individuals
reenter the panel quickly since the attrition at two year intervals is only marginally larger than
the one observed at one year intervals (for instance the two cells in 1977, 1985 and 1986, indicate
attrition of 15% and 16.5%) although this varies somewhat over time. Finally, there is a core
28
of observations which are almost always present in the panel. Looking at row 2007, we can see
that out of the 62.7% of the complete sample of individuals present in this year, it is hardly less
than 80% of this sample which is not present between 1985 and 2006 with the exception of
1994 again.
We report in Figure 1, the increase of average log-earnings over the period for the three
groups dened by age of entry. These are log-earnings at current prices although the shape
of real log-earnings is hardly di¤erent. Ination, as measured by consumer prices, leads to a
substracting factor for current log-earnings over the whole period which is equal to 1.17. This
can be roughly subdivided into two sub-periods between 1977 and 1986 in which this factor is
equal to .77 and between 1986 and 2007 during which ination levelled o¤and this factor is equal
to .40. We do not report the evolution of average log-earnings by groups dened by education
and age of entry, the only individual characteristics that are available in the dataset although
these evolutions are parallel to the ones graphed in Figure 1. Nonetheless, as already said, the
variance of log-earnings that we consider from now on are computed by taking deviations of
log-earnings with respect to their means in groups dened by covariates and periods.
The left panel of Figure 2 represents the change in the cross-sectional variance of (log)
earnings for the full sample, while the right panel represents the variance by groups dened by
age of entry.7 The rst few years witness a strong variability of earnings. Until the sixth year
of observation, 1982 (respectively the fourth, 1980), the variance of log earnings drops for the
low skill groups (resp. for the other groups) whereas it increases gradually over the rest of the
sample period till around 1995. The variance prole is at afterwards in contrast to the US
(PSID) where it continues to grow (Rubinstein and Weiss, 2006). From the right panel one
can notice that late entrants in the labor market experience higher earnings variance levels and
a larger rate of variance growth over their life-cycle. The full covariance matrix is reported in
Table 3 and gives information about correlations although this is easier to use graphs to describe
the main features of this matrix. Figure 3 displays for the full sample the autocorrelation of
residuals of log earnings with residuals in an early (resp. late) year, 1986 (resp. 2007). This
Figure reveals an asymetric pattern over time which is quite robust to the choice of these specic
years (1986 and 2007). The correlation between earnings at years t k and posterior t is quickly
disappearing between t and t  k in early years of the panel while it is roughly linear in lags in
7Choosing the variance as a description of the process is adapted to the random e¤ect specication that we
estimate. Using other inequality indices (Gini , Theil or Atkinson) does not change the qualitative features of
our descriptions.
29
late years. Figure 4 takes a di¤erent view that conrm the previous diagnostic by plotting the
autocorrelations of order 1 and 6. Note that their shape are very similar and increase uniformly
over time although at di¤erent levels. The closer we move to the end of the period, the larger
the autocorrelation coe¢ cients are.
Finally, Table 4 reports the autocorrelation patterns of the rst di¤erences in the earnings
residuals. Contrary to what is found in some papers in the literature using PSID data (for
instance, Meghir and Pistaferri, 2010) we do not nd strong evidence that the correlation dis-
appears after taking a two period di¤erence. A few very long di¤erence autocorrelations seem
signicant and no regular pattern seems to emerge.
6 Results
We rst present the estimated parameters of the reduced form earnings equation by random
e¤ect ML estimation and we discuss the selection of the ARMA specication. In section 6.2 we
detail the procedure we implement to estimate unconstrained individual factor loadings or xed
e¤ects. Next, we test and impose structural constraints on estimates. This leads us in Subsection
6.4 to the estimation of structural parameters which are identied (the terminal value coe¢ cient)
or partially identied (rates of return). Then we assess the counterfactual impact of changes in
life expectancy on the variance of earnings.
6.1 Random e¤ect estimation and reduced form parameters
Firstly, we estimate covariance matrices of the permanent and transitory components of the
errors as well as their correlation with the initial conditions. The former is composed by three
individual unobserved factors (ci1; 
c
i2; 
c
i3), while the latter is represented by an ARMA process
as explained in the previous section. Table 5 provides the values of the Akaike criterion based
on the log-likelihood values for specications in which orders of the autoregressive and moving
average components vary from (1,1) to (3,3). Unsurprisingly, enlarging the number of AR or
MA components strongly increases the value of the sample likelihood function. Nonetheless,
increasing it beyond 3 lags is di¢ cult to implement since it involves a year, 1981, in which
observations are missing altogether. This is why we did not pursue further the exploration of
higher orders for the ARMA processes. According to the Akaike criterion we should choose
the ARMA(3,3) specication, a much more persistent specication than in most studies in the
literature. Nevertheless, the estimates of the ARMA(3,3) exhibit some estimates which are very
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imprecise, specically the ones describing the correlations between initial conditions and the MA
components (Table 6). That is why in the rest of the analysis we will use as a pivot, results from
the ARMA(3,1) model.
Table 6 presents parameter estimates. Each column reports results for di¤erent ARMA(p,q)
specications for (p; q) 2 f1; 2; 3g2. In every model, autoregressive coe¢ cients remain largely
lower than one. Their sum reects the high persistence of shocks though it is far enough from
one to reject a unit root. A formal statistical test concludes with no doubt that the process is
stationary (see Magnac and Roux, 2009). This result parallels the result of Alvarez and Arellano
(2004) on US and Spanish data or of Guvenen (2009). Autoregressive coe¢ cients are ranging
from .2 to .02 in the ARMA(3,1) specication and describe the persistence of shocks due to
unemployment spells or mobility for instance while the MA coe¢ cient is negative and might
stand for measurement errors.
The estimate of the covariance matrix of individual factor loadings is quite stable across the
di¤erent specications. Their variances are very precisely estimated at around .30 for the xed
level factor, 1; and .25 for the geometric factor, 3; and at around .04 for the linear trend factor,
2. The correlation between the linear trend and geometric factors is very strongly negative and
equal to -.95 consistently across specications. This is to be expected if the structural constraint
derived above between 2 and 3 (3 2 [ T2; 0]) is veried and we will analyze this issue more
in detail below. The correlation coe¢ cient between the geometric and the level factors, 3 and
1 is also signicantly negative around -0.6 and the one between the level and linear trend
individual specic terms is positive and around .4. The sign of the latter correlation coe¢ cient
is to be expected if the level of human capital at the entry date is positively correlated with the
returns to human capital which govern the factor loading of the linear trend.
The correlations between initial conditions and these individual factor loadings are also in-
formative. They are signicant and have an economically signicant magnitude of around .2 or
.3 in absolute value. The estimated correlations between the linear trend and geometric factors
2 and 3; and the initial conditions are similar to the estimated correlations between both
of them and the level factor. They are respectively signicantly positive and negative. More
surprisingly, the correlation between 1 and the initial conditions is also negative. That would
indicate that individuals endowed with higher starting human capital stock have more di¢ culties
to acquire immediately the level of potential earnings that correspond to their skill levels.
Finally, the estimated variance of the idiosyncratic terms is reported in Table 7. Note rst
that these parameters are identied even in years 1981, 1983 and 1990 for which information is
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missing. Nonetheless, estimates for those years are imprecise and have a magnitude that can
di¤er widely from the others and across ARMA specications because they are identied only
out of the structural restrictions that we placed by assuming an ARMA process. Regarding
the "normal" years, period-specic variances start from a rather high level in the rst three
years between .20 and .30. They generally decrease over the sample periods albeit very slowly.
Between 1984 and 2000 they are quite precisely estimated at a level around .18, except the
exceptional year 1994 in which we know that the measurement error is large, and levels o¤ at
around .14 after 2000 (except the exceptional year 2003). These estimates certainly pick up the
patterns of autocorrelations increasing over time that we spotted in the raw data (see Table 3).
Part of it is certainly attributable to measurement errors although another part of it could be
attributed to a decreasing impact of shocks along the life cycle.
Long-run vs Short-run decompositions and Goodness-of-Fit
Table 8 provides a decomposition of the cross-sectional inequality into permanent and trans-
itory components. The rst column indicates the variance of logs earnings at three points in time
1977, 1981 and 2007 and the mean value over the sample period 1977-2007 for the full sample
and three di¤erent sub-samples by age of entry on the labor market (for which we estimated
the same random e¤ect model). The second column measures the share of the variance due to
permanent factors and the third measures the share due to the dynamic component. Firstly, on
average, 64% of the variance is due to permanent factors. This share displays a sharp increase
over the life cycle from 3% at entry on the labor market to 88% thirty years later. Secondly,
there are strong di¤erences by sub-groups. On the one hand, individuals entering the labor
market earlier witness less inequality on average than more skilled ones (0.104 vs 0.233), on the
other hand they experience a larger share of transitory inequality, while permanent individual
heterogeneity is more important for individuals entering the labor market at an older age (72.1%
vs 57.4%).
Goodness-of-t is examined in di¤erent graphs. In Figure 2, we report how the estimated
variances as well as the observed variances evolve over time. They t very nicely in the rst part
of the sample (until 1994) but this breaks down after 1994 after which the evolution of variances
is reproduced but at a level which is higher than the observed level. It conrms that 1994 is an
abnormal year even if the goodness-of-t for autocorrelations is good as reproduced in Figures
3 and 4.
We tried di¤erent mechanisms in order to understand better the discrepancy between ob-
served and predicted variance proles. One possibility is to allow for an additional measurement
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error term in 1994 for instance, like in Guvenen (2009) or to drop this year altogether. These
attempts did not a¤ect goodness-of-t. A more disturbing explanation for those discrepancies is
that it reects a failure in the missing at random hypothesis. When one represents the evolution
of earnings variance over the life-cycle using xed e¤ect estimates (see below), it clearly appears
that the level of these variances depend on the number of periods of observation we have for
each person. Variances are higher for persons being present in the panel shorter periods of time
and biases do not seem to be able to fully explain this feature. Nevertheless, correcting for non
random attrition seems out of the scope of this paper and we leave it for further research.
6.2 Fixed e¤ect estimation
Using previous estimates, it is easy to construct xed e¤ect estimates of the three individual
factor loadings. Appendix C.1 shows how we use, for this purpose, random e¤ect estimates of
the covariance matrices of log earnings residuals as well as the way we impute back the earnings
averages to individual factors. Standard errors for any function of xed e¤ects are computed
using sampling variability to which is added the e¤ects of parameter uncertainty due to random
e¤ect estimation. We use Monte Carlo simulations to compute the latter by sampling 1000 times
in the asymptotic distribution of random e¤ects estimates.
It is worth recalling that xed e¤ect estimates are not consistent if the number of periods T is
xed (for instance, Arellano and Bonhomme, 2010). Table 9 presents the estimates of quantiles of
their distributions distinguishing subsamples of observations according to the number of periods
they are observed (between 4 and 28). The bias in 1=T is noticeable as the larger the number of
observed periods is, the lower the inter-quartile ratio for all three factors. Overall the median of
the coe¢ cient attached to the level factor is of the order of magnitude of the mean earnings at
around 2.5 and the range between the 20th and 80th percentile is .5 if the number of observed
periods is maximal (T = 28). The median of the coe¢ cient of the linear trend factor which can
be interpreted as the return to experience at the initial stage is of the order of 3 or 4% while its
20-80 quantile range is about 6-8%. Finally, the median of the coe¢ cient of the geometric factor
lies around -.17 and its inter-quantile range is about .40. This coe¢ cient enters multiplicatively
in the curvature of the earnings proles over time since the second derivative of the latter with
respect to time is this coe¢ cient multiplied by (log )2 = 2:5:10 3. This ts well with the usual
estimates of earnings equations predicting the maximal value of earnings at a time t close to
log(log()2=3)= log  which is equal to 31.2 at the median estimates.
Table 10 presents estimates of the covariance matrix of individual e¤ects or factor loadings
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obtained by xed and random e¤ect methods. We nd again that for a small number of periods
of observation (less than 22) the estimates are severely biased upwards and this a¤ects the
xed e¤ect estimates for the complete sample when compared to the consistent random e¤ect
estimates. For the two remaining grouping of observed periods ( (22,26] and (27,28]), random
e¤ect estimates lie between or close to these two xed-e¤ect estimates. This might be due not
only to a remaining 1=T bias but also to di¤erent underlying stochastics which characterize these
two sub-populations. Random e¤ect estimates would be the mixture of these two groups. Table
11 reports the statistics using bias corrected estimates. First, bias-correction at the rst order
does not seem su¢ ciently precise to correct the bias for observations which are observed less
than 22 periods. Bias correction works much better for the other observations with a tendency
to overcorrect in the group of observations observed more than 26 periods.
This interpretation nds some conrmation in the representation of the prole of variances
of earnings along the life-cycle in Figure 5. This sets more clearly the question whether these
xed e¤ect estimates are able to reproduce the pattern of earnings variances over time. In both
panels of this Figure, we graphed the life-cycle prole of variances due to the factor part of the
model only (i.e. the permanent e¤ects due to factors and factor loadings V (M()ci)) in which
matrix M() is composed by a constant, a trend and the geometric rate  t (see Appendix
B). Transitory earnings are xed and their passive rôle obscures these comparisons so that we
found it better not to include them. Figure 5 graphs the prediction of the variance proles that
can be computed using random e¤ects rst, xed e¤ects second and bias-corrected xed e¤ects
third. We use the subsample in which the number of observed periods is larger than 23 because
Table 10 and Table 11 show that the bias is much less severe for such observations. Earnings
proles using xed e¤ect estimates reproduce the random e¤ect prole at a higher level in Figure
5 although correcting the bias tend to overcorrect. Discrepancies with random e¤ect estimates
seem nevertheless second order and this validates the use of this selected sample in the following.
6.3 Structural restrictions and Constrained estimates
With these estimates in hand, we can directly evaluate the relevance of economic restrictions;
We have three restrictions, the coe¢ cient of the linear trend should be positive (2 > 0); the
coe¢ cient of the geometric factor should be negative (3 < 0) and a weighted sum of these two
coe¢ cients should be positive (3 +T2 > 0). Parameter T > 0 is xed in the population and
a function of  (see Section 4.4).
An informal way of representing those restrictions is brought about by Figure 6. The clouds
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of points for 2 and 3 is scattered around a downward sloping line and this reects the strong
negative correlation between these two factor loadings that was found using random e¤ect es-
timates. This is no doubt attributable to the very di¤erent asymptotic behaviour of the two
factors, one being a linear trend and the other being geometric. Second, points in orange (or
light) refer to observations for which the sample periods are few (less than 20) and they are more
scattered than the blue (or dark) points which refer to more continuously observed individuals.
Finally, constraints are represented by the triangle in red (or dark). This Figure makes clear
that the satisfaction of the constraints are very sensitive to two key elements. The position of
the origin point (0,0) whose estimation depends on the model we have for average earnings that
is described in Appendix C.1 and that leads to the imputation of averages for s. Second, the
T parameter which determines the slope of the bottom-left side of the triangle.
More formally, Tables 12 and 13 report frequencies of restriction violations using previous
estimates and the same presentation regarding the number of observed periods. In Table 12,
we report the sample frequency of individual rejections at level 5% of each of the three single
restrictions using a standard asymptotic approximation. This frequency tends to decrease with
the number of observed periods and this may be partly due to the quality of the normal asymp-
totic approximation that we use for testing. Concentrating on the two groups for which the
number of observed periods belongs to (22,26] and (26,28], we see that the rst two restrictions
that the random growth parameter, i2; is positive and the curvature parameter, i3, is negative
is plausible.
The last restriction involving both parameters is less acceptable at least in the group (22,26]
and this restriction is related to the assumption that investments are positive until period T .
This hypothesis seems to be more acceptable in the last group in the almost complete subsample,
(26,28]. This means that some people stop investing before the end of the period of observation
and this agrees with hours of formal learning decreasing with age as emphasized by Mincer
(1997).
Table 13 reports testing experiments of the three restrictions, globally and it is convenient
to compute rst constrained estimates of the individual factors. Unconstrained factors are pro-
jected on the set of constraints using the quadratic metric given by the covariance matrix of the
s estimated in the rst-step random e¤ect estimation. This procedure is explained in Appendix
C.3: The value of the quadratic metric measuring the distance between constrained and uncon-
strained estimates is the quasi likelihood ratio (QLR) statistic associated to the global restriction
(Silvapulle and Sen, 2005). P-values are obtained by simulation in the distribution of the stat-
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istic under the null. Table 13 reports the sampling frequency of individual rejections using three
di¤erent levels (0.01, 0.05 and 0.10) using the standard asymptotic approximation.8 Overall,
these results are slightly less favourable for the specication that we use and the frequency of
rejections is far larger than the level, in particular in the incomplete group (Ti 2 (22; 26]) and
when the level is small (0.01, 0.05). There seems to exist a "fat tail" of observations for which
we reject these restrictions.
To conrm this diagnostic by evaluating the distribution of the QLR statistic, we computed
the distance between the unconstrained and the constrained estimates and compare this distance
with the distance between the same constrained estimates and simulated unconstrained estimates
using normal random draws for the simulations. In all these experiments, we use the covariance
matrix of the s as a weighting matrix to compute the distance and as the basis for simulating
the normal errors. Table 14 reports the quantiles of the distributions of the actual and simulated
distances. The two distributions coincide rather well for all quantiles until .6 but the divergence
becomes severe over .6 and specically at the upper end. This can either be due to the rejection
of the constraints or to the non normality of the factors which is a standard nding in studies
that assess the normality of individual e¤ects in earnings functions (Hirano, 2002 for instance).
Figure 7 reports the graphs of the life-cycle prole of variance earnings using constrained and
simulated estimates. The concavity pattern is more pronounced when we use these estimates
than when we use random or unconstrained xed e¤ect estimates as in Figure 5. The trough
of the prole due to permanent e¤ects (the Mincer "dip") is happening latter in the life cycle
(t = 12) in this Figure with respect to t = 5 using the random e¤ect specication.
6.4 Structural parameter estimates and Counterfactuals
These constrained reduced form estimates can be used to construct structural parameter estim-
ates and counterfactuals. There are two empirical strategies: keep the whole sample or keep only
observations for which the period of observation is long enough and the bias is second-order. We
chose the second strategy and kept for these estimations and counterfactuals only observations
for which the number of observations is larger than 23.
Parameter i that governs the magnitude of post-retirement returns in human capital can be
easily estimated using the distribution of 2 and 3 and its distribution is bounded between 0
and 1=(1 ) = 1=(1  :95) = 20 (Proposition 5). As said above, reduced-form parameters at the
8Because these computations are numerically intensive, the number of simulations in assessing standard errors
due to parameter uncertainty is smaller than previously (see notes to Tables).
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frontier of the constrained set generate implausible economic estimates of structural parameters
i or i. This is why instead of using constrained estimates, we draw simulated estimates into
the posterior distribution of the constrained estimates as explained in Appendix C.4. Figure 8
presents a standard kernel estimate of the distribution of the structural parameter i (with no
corrections for the left-hand side bound at 0) that shows that the distribution of this parameter
is skewed towards value 0. Only a lower bound of parameter i is identied and its distribution
is reported in Table 15. The lower bound lies between .05 and a large maximal value that is due
to the constraint that iL > 1=i.
The counterfactual exercise of prolonging life expectancy is easily implemented. Life expect-
ancy is increased by two years (K = 2) and we use the simulated structural estimates as derived
in the previous section to compute those counterfactuals. Nonetheless, as developed in Section
4.5, this counterfactual is only partially identied because the rate of return is only partially
identied. We rst set the individual specic rate of return to the minimal estimated value and
check the robustness of results by using larger and larger rates of return by multiplying them by
xed values. We report results for the minimal value and not the robustness checks that show
that these estimates are quite robust to changes in the assumptions about .9 In Figure 9, the top
panel reports the e¤ect on mean earnings for those individuals who are observed more than 23
periods. Mean earnings increase and the more so the closer we are to the end of the observation
period. This change has also an impact on the prole of earnings variance reported in Figure 9,
bottom panel. Variances are increasing in particular at the end of the period. Because rates of
return are heterogenous, a larger life expectancy magnies individual di¤erences in earnings and
this implies more earnings inequalities. In the last period, this increases cross-section inequality
by 20% although this gure is quite imprecise because standard errors are quite large. Nonethe-
less, we chose an experiment of K = 2 years because it is the limit case for which observed and
counterfactual 95% condence intervals are contiguous. When K = 3; they are well separated.
7 Extensions
In order to show the versatility of our theoretical approach, we nally develop an extended
model in which investment costs depend on human capital levels. Human capital depreciates
at a common and exogenous exponential rate  2 (0; 1) in the human capital accumulation
equation
9In theory, the true identied set is obtained by making the parameters controling partial identication
individual specic. Analyzing results in this case is left for future research.
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Hi(t+ 1) = Hi(t)
 exp[i i(t)  i(t)]:
This is equivalent to making human capital investments more and more costly when human
capital levels increase.
Individuals maximize the present discounted value of their earnings streams, and their ob-
jective function is given by
Vt(Hi(t);  i(t)) = (t) + logHi(t) 

 i(t) + ci
 i(t)
2
2

+ Et [Wt+1(Hi(t+ 1))]
The rst order condition of the maximization problem for t < T is
  [1 + c i(t)] + iHi(t+ 1)Et

@Wt+1
@Hi(t+ 1)

= 0: (23)
The marginal value of human capital is the derivative of the Bellman equation so that by the
envelope theorem:
@Wt
@Hi(t)
=
1
Hi(t)
+ Et

@Wt+1
@Hi(t+ 1)

Hi(t+ 1)
Hi(t)
(24)
Introducing condition (23) into condition (24) we obtain
@Wt
@Hi(t)
=
1
Hi(t)
+

i
[1 + ci i(t)]
Hi(t)
:
Inserting this condition at lead t+ 1 in condition (23), we obtain the Euler equation for  i()
(1 + ci i(t)) =  [i + Et (1 + c i(t+ 1))] ;
which can written, denoting mi(t) = (1 + ci i(t)) ; as:
mi(t) =  [i + Etmi(t+ 1)] : (25)
For t = T; condition (24) writes more simply as:
@WT
@Hi(T )
=

Hi(T )
;
so that condition (25) at time T   1 becomes:
mi(T   1) = i:
We can solve forward equation (25):
mi(t) = i
T t 1X
j=1
()j +
()T t

i
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so that:
(1 + ci i(t)) = iat (26)
with
at =
()T t

+ 
1  ()T t 1
1  
and therefore:
 i(t) =
1
ci
fiat   1g 8t < T (27)
Moreover, the stock of human capital in period t depends on previous investment choices. Using
lower case letters to denote log variables (ie: hi(t) = logHi(t)):
hi(t+ 1) = 
t shi(s) + i
tX
l=s
t l i(l) 
tX
l=s
t li(l) for t > s:
= t shi(s) + i
tX
l=s
t l

1
ci

if
()T l

+ 
1  ()T l 1
1   g   1

i(l)

= t shi(s) 
tX
l=s
t li(l) +
2i
ci
tX
l=s
t l

()T l

+ 
1  ()T l 1
1   )

  i
ci

s t 1   1
  1

t+1 s
Since log yi(t) = (t) + hi(t) we have
log yi(t) = t  
tX
l=s
t li(l) + t shi(s) +
i
ci

s t 1   1
  1

t+1 s
+
2i
ci
tX
l=s
t l

()T l

+ 
1  ()T l 1
1   )

which is a model with several geometric factors.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a structural model of human capital investments that leads to a three
linear factor model describing unobserved heterogeneity components of the earnings equation.
Using a long panel on a single cohort of wage earners in France from 1977 to 2007, we estimated
the reduced form parameters by random e¤ect maximum likelihood methods that deliver the
covariance matrix of the random e¤ects. We constructed xed e¤ect estimates of factor loadings
and assess their bias and degree of accuracy. This procedure enables us to evaluate the relevance
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of structural restrictions and construct constrained estimators. We then derive estimates of some
structural components in the original model in terms of returns and terminal capitalized returns
to investments. This allows us to compute richer counterfactuals than the ones that are directly
available using random e¤ect procedures.
Random e¤ect estimation delivers empirical results which are close to what has been ob-
tained in the literature and are easily interpretable in a human capital framework. Fixed e¤ect
estimation evinces that structural restrictions are not rejected for most of our sample observa-
tions. It remains to be seen if this is because of the low power of our testing procedure as in
Baker (1997) in which heterogenous growth and random walk models are hard to discriminate.
Furthermore, a simple counterfactual analysis shows that increasing life expectancy has quite a
large e¤ect on earnings inequality even if this result is obtained in a partial analysis in which
initial human capital investments are held constant. It seems dubious to us that making those
initial investments vary as well in the counterfactual scenario would overturn this conclusion if
individual specic rates of returns to schooling and post-schooling are strongly correlated.
There are many extensions worth exploring that we are leaving for future research. First,
human capital investment proles vary across di¤erent education groups. In particular, a pending
conjecture would be that investments by the low skill group stop much earlier than those by
the high skill group. Second, goodness-of-t measures seem to point out that the missing at
random assumption might be invalid. Analyzing this condition using complete and incomplete
samples might lead to a better correction of selection and small sample biases although this is
a project on its own. Another theoretical issue in econometric modelling is the analysis of a
mixture of the heterogenous growth and random walk specications of the earnings equation
and specically identication issues. Finally, regarding theoretical issues, we are developing in
a companion paper the case of linear investment technologies in human capital which allows to
analyze nancial and human capital investments simultaneously.
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APPENDICES
A Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The rst order condition of the maximization problem for t < T + 1 is
  (1 + ci i(t)) + iHi(t+ 1)Et

@Wt+1
@Hi(t+ 1)

= 0: (A.1)
The marginal value of human capital is the derivative of the Bellman equation so that by the
envelope theorem:
@Wt
@Hi(t)
=
1
Hi(t)
+ Et

@Wt+1
@Hi(t+ 1)

Hi(t+ 1)
Hi(t)
(A.2)
For t = T + 1; condition (A.2) writes more simply as:
@WT+1
@Hi(T + 1)
=
i
Hi(T + 1)
=) Hi(T + 1) @WT+1
@Hi(T + 1)
= i;
so that, by backward induction, we obtain:
Hi(T )
@WT
@Hi(T )
= 1 + i; Hi(T   1) @WT 1
@Hi(T   1) = 1 + (1 + i)
and so on. This yields:
Hi(t+ 1)
@Wt+1
@Hi(t+ 1)
=
1  T t
1   + 
T ti:
Replacing in equation (A.1) yields:
(1 + ci i(t)) = i

1
1   + 
T t(i   1
1   )

= i


1   + 
T+1 t(i   1
1   )

;
and equation (7) follows. Furthermore, as the second term in (A.1) is constant, the second order
condition is satised if and only if ici > 0.
Furthermore and given that ci > 0; the condition that investments are always positive yields:
i


1   + 
T+1 t(i   1
1   )

  1  0: 8t < T + 1
As i  11  < 0 and  < 1,  i(t) is decreasing in t because of the term  t and the RHS attains
its minimum at t = T . This yields condition (6) since:
i


1   + (i  
1
1   )

  1  0() i 
1
i
:
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
First, condition (8) is consistent since it = 1 + i;t+1 > i;t+1 , i;t+1 < 11  , i;t+2 < 11 
and by repetition i;T+1 1 = i < 11  .
We proceed by backward induction. By Proposition 1, we know that
 i(T ) > 0() 1
i;T+1 1
< i 
1
i;T+1
;
and under this latter condition, that equation (7) is satised for all t+ 1  T .
Assume that for some t+ 1  T :
8t0  t+ 2; t0 < T + 1;  i(t0) = 0; and  i(t+ 1) > 0() 1
i;t+1
< i 
1
i;t+2
(A.3)
and under this latter condition, that equation (7) is satised for all t0  t + 1. In a proof of
Proposition 2 by backward induction, we thus shall prove that condition (A.3) is true at period
t.
We analyze separately the condition  i(t0) = 0;8t0  t+ 1 and the condition  i(t) > 0.
Assume rst that  i(t0) = 0;8t0  t + 1 so that the condition  i(t0) > 0 is violated for any
t0  t + 1 and therefore by equation (A.3), i  1=i;t+1. Conversely, if i  1=i;t+1 then
 i(t
0) = 0;8t0  t + 1 because equation (A.3) is satised for t0  t + 1 Furthermore, conditions
 i(t
0) = 0 implies simple forms for the Bellman equation (3):
Wt(Hi(t
0)) = i(t0) + logHi(t0) + Et0Wt0+1(Hi(t0 + 1));
and the accumulation equation (1):
logHi(t
0 + 1) = logHi(t0)  i(t0):
Using equation (4) where we set iT+1 1 = i and the linearity of the previous two equations
lead to the condition derived by induction again:
Wt0(Hi(t
0)) = (t0) + i;t0 1 logHi(t0): (A.4)
for any t0  t+ 1 and where it = 1 + i;t+1.
Second, assume that  i(t) > 0. Proposition 1 can be recast in a set-up where the last period
becomes Si = t+ 1 instead of T + 1 since there are no further human capital investments after
this date and since the value function can be written as in equation (A.4) evaluated at t0 = t+1.
We rewrite equation (7) and obtain:
 i(t) =
1
ci

i


1   + (it  
1
1   )

  1

> 0;
which is equivalent to i >
1
it
.
Therefore the equivalence stated in the Proposition is true at period t: Furthermore equation
(7) applies for any t0  t. The statement under induction is therefore true at any date t 2
f0; :; Tg. By convention we set 1
i0
= 0 in order to cover all cases since i > 0:
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The two equations (16) and (17) simplify to:8<: i2 =
i
ci

i

1    1

;
i3 =
i
ci
T+1(i   11  )

i

1    1

:
(A.5)
Taking the ratio of the second and the rst equation yields:
i3
i2
= T+1(i   1
1   )
we derive the restriction from i 2 [0; 11  ] that:
i3
i2
2 [  
T+1
1   ; 0]: (A.6)
Conversely, if this restriction is valid, then i is given by:
i =
1
1   + 
 (T+1)i3
i2
2 (0; 1
1   ):
Furthermore, Proposition 1 proved that investments remain positive until period T (inclusively)
if and only if ii > 1: This yields that :
i > 
L
i =
1
i
=
1
1
1  + 
T+1 i3
i2
> 0;
by the above. The rst equation of (A.5):
i2 =
i
ci

i

1     1

=
i
cii

ii
1     i

;
also implies that, given that all parameters are positive that
i2 >
i
cii

1
1     i

> 0:
Conversely, assume that i2 > 0 and i > 
L
i : By construction, the condition ii > 1 is
satised and investments are positive until T: Second, dene
ci =
i
2i

i

1     1

;
and write
@ci
@i
=
1
2i

2i

1     1

which is positive since i

1  > 1 because ii > 1 and i  11  : Both expressions prove that
c(i; 2i) =
i
2i

i

1     1

is positive and increasing in i: Therefore ci  cL = c(L; 2i):
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B Model Specication and Likelihood function
The main di¤erence with standard specications lies in the introduction of three individual
heterogeneity factors that interact in a specic way with factors depending on time. Equation
(21) writes
u
[1;T ]
i = M ()
[1;T ] ci + v
[1;T ]
i
where u[1;T ]i = (ui1; :::; uiT )
0, v[1;T ]i = (vi1; :::; viT )
0 ; ci = (
c
i1; 
c
i2; 
c
i3) are the centered versions of
the s and:
M ()[1;T ] =
264 1 1 1=... ... ...
1 T 1=T
375 ;
is a [T; 3] matrix. The system is further completed by some initial conditions, the number of
which depends on the order of the autoregressive process. Denote p this order and write the
initial conditions as:
u
[1 p;0]
i = v
[1 p;0]
i
since unrestricted dependence between v[1;T ]i ; 
c
i and those initial conditions will be allowed for.
We can rewrite the whole system as:
u
[1 p;T ]
i = M ()
[1 p;T ] ci + v
[1 p;T ]
i
in which the matrix M ()[1 p;T ] is completed by p rows equal to zero, M ()[1 p;0] = 0.
We now go further and specify the correlation structure. A comment is in order. Usually,
the autoregressive structure directly applies to earnings residuals uit and in the absence of
covariates, this is equivalent to specifying it through the residual part vit because there is a
single individual e¤ect. This equivalence still holds when another heterogeneity factor interacted
with a linear trend is present. Nevertheless, our specication includes a third factor interacted
with a geometric term and this breaks the equivalence. To circumvent this problem, we posit
that vit is a (time heteroskedastic) ARMA process whose innovations are independent of the
individual heterogeneity terms, ci . As a consequence, our variable of interest, uit, is the sum of
two processes, the rst one being related to xed individual heterogeneity and the second one
to the pure dynamic process. These processes are supposed to be independent between them
although they are both correlated with initial conditions, u[1 p;0]i .
We are now going to derive the covariance matrix of u[1 p;T ]i as a function of the parameters of
these processes in two steps . We rst study the ARMA process and then include the individual
heterogeneity factors.
B.1 Time heteroskedastic ARMA specication
Following Alvarez and Arellano (2004) or Guvenen (2009), we specify
vit = 1vi(t 1) + :::+ pvi(t p) + twit
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where wit is MA(q):
wit =  it    1 it 1   :::   q it q:
Let  = (1; :; p) and MT () a matrix of size [T; T + p] where p = dim():
MT () =
0BBB@
 p :::  1 1 0 ::: 0
0  p :::  1 1 . . . ...
...
. . . . . .
...
. . . . . . 0
0 ::: 0  p :::  1 1
1CCCA :
As v[1 p;T ]i =
 
vi(1 p); :::; viT

; we have:  
Ip 0

MT ()

v
[1 p;T ]
i =
 
v
[1 p;0]
i
tw
[1;T ]
i
!
Since wit is MA (q), we have
w
[1;T ]
i = MT ( ):
[1 q;T ]
i
where  [1 q;T ]i = ( i1 q; :::;  iT ).
Denote  a diagonal matrix whose diagonal is (1; :; T ) to get the following description of
the stochastic process as a function of initial conditions and idiosyncratic errors:
Ip 0
MT ()

:v
[1 p;T ]
i =

Ip 0p;T+q
0T;p :MT ( )
 
v
[1 p;0]
i

[1 q;T ]
i
!
: (B.7)
To compute the covariance of v[1 p;T ]i , we derive the covariance matrix of

v
[1 p;0]
i 
[1 q;T ]
i

:
Since  [1 q;T ]i are i.i.d and are of variance 1, the South-East corner of the matrix is the identity
matrix of size (1 + q + T ). The North West corner is assumed to be an unrestricted covariance
matrix V y[1 p;0]i =  00. Assuming as usual that E(yi it) = 0 for any  < t, we have that
E(v
[1 p;0]
i :(
[1;T ]
i )
0) = 0: Only E(y[1 p;0]i :(
[1 q;0]
i )
0) remains to be dened:
E(v
[1 p;0]
i :(
[1 q;0]
i )
0) = 
 = [!rs]
where r 2 [1  p; 0] and s 2 [1  q; 0] and where:
r < s : !rs = 0
r  s : !rs is not constrained
because the innovation si is drawn after r and is supposed to be not correlated with y
r
i .
Hence the covariance matrix of zi =
 
v
[1 p;0]
i

[1 q;T ]
i
!
writes :

z = V
 
v
[1 p;0]
i

[1 q;T ]
i
!
= V
0B@ v
[1 p;0]
i

[1 q;0]
i

[1;T ]
i
1CA =
0@  00 
 0
0 Iq 0
0 0 IT
1A :
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B.2 Individual heterogeneity
The covariance matrix of the individual heterogeneity factors is denoted . as said above, we
assume that the xed heterogeneity terms are independent from the whole innovation process

[1 q;T ]
i . As for the covariance structure between initial conditions and those factors, we assume
that:
E

v
[1 p;0]
i (
c
i)
0

=  0
Consider the covariance matrix of initial conditions  :
 = V
0@ v[1 p;0]i ci

[1 q;0]
i
1A =
0@  00  0 
 00  0

 0 Iq
1A :
and dene,
RT () =
  
Ip 0

MT ()
 1
ST;p( ;) =

Ip 0p;T+q
0T;p :MT ( )

Write the covariance matrix of vector y[1 p;T ]i :

y = V

u
[1 p;T ]
i

= V

v
[1 p;T ]
i +M ()
[1 p;T ] ci

= V
0@hM ()[1 p;T ] ; RT ():ST;p( ;)i
0@ civ[1 p;0]i

[1 q;T ]
i
1A1A
Since v[1 p;T ]i = RT ():ST;p( ;)
 
v
[1 p;0]
i

[1 q;T ]
i
!
, the matrix
V

v
[1 p;T ]
i

= RT ():ST;p( ;):
z:ST;p( ;)
0RT ()0
and
E

v
[1 p;T ]
i 
0
i

M ()[1 p;T ]0 = RT ():ST;p( ;)E
 
v
[1 p;0]
i (
c
i)
0

[1 q;T ]
i (
c
i)
0
!
M ()[1 p;T ]0
= RT ():ST;p( ;)

 0
0T+q;3

M ()[1 p;T ]0
= RT ():

Ip 0p;T+q
0T;p :MT ( )

 0
0T+q;3

03;p;M ()
[1;T ]0

= RT ():

Ip 0p;T+q
0T;p :MT ( )

0p;p  0M ()
[1;T ]0
0T+q;p 0T+q;T

= RT ():

0p;p  0M ()
[1;T ]0
0T;p 0T;T

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Hence,

y = RT ():ST;p( ;):
z:ST;p( ;)
0RT ()0 +M ()
[1 p;T ] M ()
[1 p;T ]0
+RT ():

0p;p  0M ()
[1;T ]0
0T;p 0T;T

+

0p;p 0p;T
M ()[1;T ]  00 0T;T

RT ()
0
The two rst terms correspond to variances of the dynamic process and the individual heterogen-
eity factors, the other terms correspond to the correlation between the two processes induced by
initial conditions. Note that the parameters of the MA process does not appear in the correla-
tion between the two processes since innovations are supposed to be independent with individual
heterogeneity factors. Initial conditions are given by  [1 q;0]i , 
c and v[1 p;0]i .
The Choleski decomposition of matrix  can be parametrized expressing the following matrix
into a polar coordinate basis.0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 ::: ::: 0
0
. . .
. . .
. . .
.
.
.
.
.
. 0 1 0
. . .
::: 0 1 0 0
. . .
!12 1 0
0 !13 !
23
 1 0
.
.
. (1)1 q;1 p 1;1 p 2;1 p 3;1 p 1
0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 2 p;2 p
. . . 1

(1)
0;0 1;0 21;0 3;0 :::
. . . 0;0 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
where (1)1 q;1 p = 0 if p > q and, more generally, 
(1)
l;m = 0 if l > m.
C Fixed E¤ects, Constrained E¤ects and Counterfactu-
als
C.1 Estimates of individual factors given observed wages
The main equation is:
u
[1 p;T ]
i = M()
[1 p;T ]ci + v
[1 p;T ]
i ;
where ci and v
[1 p;T ]
i are centered by construction and where a row of M() is dened as
M()[t] = (1; t; 1=t) as in Appendix B.
Later on, we shall reintroduce the estimated averages, g, of the individual e¤ects that we
estimate by OLS using the sub-groups dened by age of entry and skill level (21 groups). Dene
the average in each group as y[1 p;T ]g and dene:
g = (M()
[1 p;T ]0M()[1 p;T ]) 1M()[1 p;T ]0y[1 p;T ]g :
We now present the xed e¤ect estimation of ci . We consider rst the case with no missing
values and extend it to the case with missing values. We nally analyze how to deal in the
simulations with constraints on i.
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C.2 Estimating individual e¤ects
Assume rst that there are no missing values. To deal with the correlation between ci and vi,
we can always write:
v
[1 p;T ]
i = Ci + w
[1 p;T ]
i ;
where E((ci)
0w[1 p;T ]i ) = 0 so that we get:
C = E(v
[1 p;T ]
i (
c
i)
0)(E(ci(
c
i)
0)) 1;
and:

w = E(v
[1 p;T ]
i v
[1 p;T ]0
i )  E(v[1 p;T ]i (ci)0)(E(ci(ci)0)) 1E(civ[1 p;T ]0i ):
This yields the estimating equation for ci :
u
[1 p;T ]
i = D
c
i + w
[1 p;T ]
i where D = M()
[1 p;T ] + C;
that might be estimated by GLS methods.
It is nevertheless useful to write likelihood functions that will help later to dene constrained
estimates. Dene the conditional (pseudo) likelihood function as:
L(u
[1 p;T ]
i j ci) =
1
(2)T=2 det 

1=2
v
exp

 1
2
(u
[1 p;T ]
i  Dci)0
 1w (u[1 p;T ]i  Dci)

;
in which 
w = V (w
[1 p;T ]
i ):
We are seeking the conditional distribution of ci conditional on the observed u
[1 p;T ]
i which
can be expressed by Bayes law, using a prior for ci , L0(
c
i) as:
L(ci j u[1 p;T ]i ) =
L(u
[1 p;T ]
i j ci)L0(ci)R
L(u
[1 p;T ]
i j ci)L0(ci)dci
:
Consequently, the distribution function L(ci j u[1 p;T ]i ) can be written as:
H(u
[1 p;T ]
i ): exp

 1
2
(ci  Bu[1 p;T ]i )0
 1 (ci  Bu[1 p;T ]i )

L0(
c
i)
where the constant of integration is derived by setting to one the integral over ci . In the case
of a di¤use prior i.e. L0(ci) = 1; the constant of integration is no longer dependent on u
[1 p;T ]
i
and is equal to the usual reciprocal of (2)3=2 det 
1=2 . When there are constraints on ci ; these
constraints can be included in the prior (see below).
As all terms in ci and u
[1 p;T ]
i are quadratic, we can derive the unknown matrices B and 

by solving:
(u
[1 p;T ]
i  Dci)0
 1w (u[1 p;T ]i  Dci) = (ci  Bu[1 p;T ]i )0
 1 (ci  Bu[1 p;T ]i ) + u[1 p;T ]0i Au[1 p;T ]i :
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By identifying quadratic terms in (ci ; 
c
i); (u
[1 p;T ]
i ; 
c
i) and (u
[1 p;T ]
i ; u
[1 p;T ]
i ); we obtain three
equations: 8<:
D0
 1w D = 

 1
 ;
 D0
 1w =  
 1 B;

 1w = B
0
 1 B + A;
so that, as D0
 1w D is invertible:8<:

 = (D
0
 1w D)
 1;
B = (D0
 1w D)
 1D0
 1w ;
A = 
 1w   
 1w D(D0
 1w D) 1D0
 1w :
If those matrices are known, the (unfeasible) estimator for the individual xed e¤ects, by rein-
clusion of the estimated averages, are:
~ci = Bu
[1 p;T ]
i = B(D
c
i + w
[1 p;T ]
i ) = 
c
i +Bw
[1 p;T ]
i :
They are such that:
V (~ci) = EV (~
c
i j ci) + V E(~ci j ci)
=) V (~ci) = B
wB0 + V ci = 
 + V ci .
The term 
 goes to zero at least at the rate 1=T since matrix D is determined by di¤erent
factors. Some are going to zero faster than T but they are dominated by the simple factors.
The feasible estimator is now given by:
^ci = B^u
[1 p;T ]
i ;
and by reinclusion of the estimated averages for each group, g3i = g; we have:
^i = g + ^
c
i = g + B^u
[1 p;T ]
i ;
We now analyse the case with missing values. Suppose that u[1 p;T ]i is not observable, only
Siu
[1 p;T ]
i is where Si is the matrix of dimension (Ti; T + p + 1) selecting non missing values
and where Ti is the number of such non missing values. Consequently, the distribution function
L(ci j Siu[1 p;T ]i ) becomes:
Hi(Siu
[1 p;T ]
i ): exp

 1
2
(ci  BiSiu[1 p;T ]i )0
 1i (ci  BiSiu[1 p;T ]i )

L0(
c
i);
where by simple analogy to the results of the previous section:

i = (D
0S 0i(Si
wS
0
i)
 1SiD) 1;
Bi = (D
0S 0i(Si
wS
0
i)
 1SiD) 1D0S 0i(Si
wS
0
i)
 1:
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C.3 Constrained estimator
We reconsider the uncentered version of the individual e¤ects i in this section since the con-
straints apply more naturally to those. Nevertheless, we freely borrow the likelihood expressions
derived in the previous section in which we considered the centered version ci .
Using that the likelihood function L(i j y[1 p;T ]i ) is proportional to:
exp

 1
2
(i   ^i)0
 1 (i   ^i)

L0(i)
where ^i is the unconstrained estimator, we solve the following program to compute the con-
strained estimator of i
min
i
(i   ^i)0
 1 (i   ^i)
under the constraints:
i2 > 0; i3 < 0; i3 >  Ti2:
Denote 1; 2 and 3 the Lagrange multipliers associated to each constraint and write the Lag-
rangian as:
L(i) = (i   ^i)0
 1 (i   ^i)  1i2 + 2i3   3(i3 + Ti2):
Taking derivatives yields:
2
 1 (~i   ^i) 
0@ 01 + T3
3   2
1A = 0:
We immediately have that:
1. If 2 > 0; 1 = 0 then ~i3 = 0 and ~i2 > 0; and this implies that T ~i2+ ~i3 > 0 so that
3 = 0. Therefore:0@ ~i1   ^i1~i2   ^i2
 ^i3
1A+ 

2
0@ 00
2
1A = 0 =) 2e03 
2 e3 = ^i3;
where e3 = (0; 0; 1)0: This is compatible if 2 =
^i3
e0 

2
e
> 0 and therefore if ^i3 > 0 since 

is denite positive. Denoting e2 = (0; 1; 0)0; we also have:
~i2   ^i2 =  2:e02


2
e3:
This satises the condition 1 = 0 i¤ ~i2 > 0:
2. If 3 > 0; 1 = 0 then ~i3 =  T ~i2 and ~i2 > 0; and this implies that ~i3 < 0 so that
2 = 0. We have:
2
 1 (~i   ^i) 
0@ 0T
1
1A3 = 0 =) (~i   ^i) = 3 
2 vT
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denoting v = (0; T ; 1)0. Given that v0~i = ~i3 + T ~i2 = 0, this implies that :
3 =  
v0^i
v0


2
v
> 0;
if v0^i = ^i3 + T ^i2 < 0 This yields the constrained estimators, ~i2 and ~i3:
(~i   ^i) = 3


2
v0
which satisfy the constraint 1 = 0 i¤ ~i2 > 0.
3. If 1 > 0 then ~i2 = 0 and thus the constraints T ~i2+ ~i3  0 and ~i3  0 imply that
~i3 = 0; that 23 = 0 and that one of them is positive.
Summarizing:
 If ^i3 < 0; ^i2 > 0; and ^i3+T ^i2 > 0; constrained estimates, ~i; are equal to unconstrained
estimates, ^i.
 If ^i3 > 0; ^i3 + T ^i2 > 0 case 1 applies if ~i2 > 0:
 If ^i3 + T ^i2 < 0; ^i3 < 0 case 2 applies if ~i2 > 0.
 In all other cases, ~i2 = ~i3 = 0: In this case:
~i   ^i =
0@ ~i1   ^i1 ^i2
 ^i3
1A = 

2
 
e2 e3
 v1
v2

where vj are unknown. They are obtained using:

e02
e03

(~i   ^i) =

e02
e03
0@ 0 ^i2
 ^i3
1A =  e02
e03



2
 
e2 e3
 v1
v2

Denoting I>c =

e02
e03

so that:

v1
v2

=

I 0c


2
Ic
 1
I 0c
0@ 0 ^i2
 ^i3
1A
so that we get the vector:
~i   ^i = 
Ic [I 0c
Ic] 1 I 0c
0@ 0 ^i2
 ^i3
1A :
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C.4 Imposing constraints on simulations
Assume that we want to impose the constraints that i2 > 0 and that i3 < 0 and i3 >  Ti2:
Drawing in a multivariate normal distribution with multiple constraints is not as easy as with
a single constraint. We use e¢ cient Gibbs sampling as proposed by Rodriguez-Yam, Davis and
Scharf (2004).
First, denote C the Choleski decomposition of the permutation of matrix 
 (or 
i in the
case of missing values) such that:
CC
0
 = 
:
Furthermore, it is convenient to slightly change the order of s without loss of generality. As-
suming that the generic element of the lower diagonal matrix C is cij; we can write, assuming
that the expectation of i is (1; 2; 3):8<:
2 = 2 + c111;
3 = 3 + c211 + c222;
1 = 1 + c311 + c322 + c333:
We start from the remark that it is easy to draw in univariate truncated normal distributions
conditional to the other variates, for instance, f(u1 j u2 ; u3 ; u2  0; u3 2 [ Tu2 ; 0]): Second,
drawing repetitively in the conditional univariate distributions to construct a Markov chain yields
drawings that are distributed according to the joint distribution we are looking for. Furthermore,
Rodriguez-Yam, Davis and Scharf (2004) recommends drawing the independent errors 1; 2 and
3 instead of the original variables. For this, we have to rewrite the constraints as (using c11; c22
and c33 are positive, see Section C.2):
1 >   2c11 ;
2 +
c21
c22
1 <   3c22 ;
2 +
c21+T c11
c22
1 >  3+T2c22 :
(C.8)
The algorithm proceeds by considering initial values (02; 
0
3) whose construction we detail below.
Then from (k2; 
k
3), we construct (
k+1
2 ; 
k+1
3 ) using:
1. Draw k+12 in a truncated normal variable, truncated by the bounds [ 3+T2c22   c21+T c11c22 
k
1;
  3
c22
  c21
c22
k1] (a non empty interval because of the constraint 1 >   2c11 ).
2. Draw k+11 in a truncated normal variable, truncated by the bounds [L1; L2]: There are ve
cases:
 If c21 > 0: L1 = max(  2c11 ;  c22c21+T c11 (
3+T2
c22
+ k+12 ));U1 =   c22c21 ( 3c22 + 
k+1
2 )
 If c21 = 0 : L1 = max(  2c11 ;  c22c21+T c11 (
3+T2
c22
+ k+12 )); U1 = +1
 If c21 2 ( T c11; 0) : L1 = max(  2c11 ;  c22c21 ( 3c22 + 
k+1
2 );  c22c21+T c11 (
3+T2
c22
+ k+12 ));
U1 = +1
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 If c21 =  T c11 : L1 = max(  2c11 ;  c22c21 ( 3c22 + 
k+1
2 )); U1 = +1
 If c21 <  T c11 : L1 = max(  2c11 ;  c22c21 ( 3c22 +
k+1
2 )); U1 =   c22c21+T c11 (
3+T2
c22
+k+12 )).
Then construct :
When the algorithm is said to have converged to (11 ; 
1
2 ) then nish by drawing 3 in a N(0,1)
variate since no constraints are binding on 1: Construct the nal values 
k+1
2 = 2 + c11
1
1 ,
k+13 = 3 + c21
1
1 + c22
1
2 ; 
k+1
1 = 1 + c31
1
1 + c32
1
2 + c333.
The initial conditions are constructed by neglecting the multivariate aspects of constraints:
 Draw 01 in a truncated normal distribution, truncated by the bound 01 >   2c11 : Construct
02 = 2 + c11
0
1:
 Draw 02 in a truncated normal distribution, truncated by the bound [ 3+T2c22   c21+T c11c22 
0
1;  3c22 
c21
c22
01]: Construct 
0
3 = 3 + c21
0
1 + c22
0
2.
 Draw 03 in a normal distribution and construct 01 = 1 + c3101 + c3202 + c3303.
These draws satisfy the constraints but they are not truncated normally distributed.
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Table 1: Sample size
Age of Entry
Below 20 Between 20 and 23 Above 23 All
1977 4460 2112 874 7446
1978 4460 2112 874 7446
1979 3855 1923 787 6565
1980 3748 1930 785 6463
1982 4460 2112 874 7446
1984 4460 2112 874 7446
1985 3792 1808 724 6324
1986 3683 1800 726 6209
1987 3569 1741 678 5988
1988 3402 1654 637 5693
1989 3486 1657 644 5787
1991 3319 1598 613 5530
1992 3299 1581 603 5483
1993 3330 1620 627 5577
1994 2508 1316 503 4327
1995 3256 1566 578 5400
1996 3236 1557 579 5372
1997 3202 1529 556 5287
1998 3208 1521 543 5272
1999 3218 1503 547 5268
2000 3180 1506 536 5222
2001 3117 1480 517 5114
2002 3018 1463 511 4992
2003 2800 1323 467 4590
2004 2844 1387 463 4694
2005 2851 1399 467 4717
2006 2896 1382 442 4720
2007 2864 1377 429 4670
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Table 2: Missing Values
1977 1979 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1977 1
1978 1
1979 .882 .882
1980 .868 .786 .868
1982 1 .882 .868
1984 1 .882 .868
1985 .849 .751 .743 .849
1986 .834 .739 .731 .75 .834
1987 .804 .714 .704 .718 .737 .804
1988 .765 .675 .668 .694 .690 .691 .765
1989 .777 .689 .677 .701 .694 .691 .689 .777
1991 .743 .658 .65 .67 .663 .655 .649 .678 .743
1992 .736 .653 .647 .663 .655 .649 .642 .662 .679 .736
1993 .749 .665 .653 .657 .666 .654 .631 .652 .659 .673 .749
1994 .581 .515 .506 .508 .518 .511 .492 .506 .513 .517 .544 .581
1995 .725 .643 .634 .636 .644 .632 .609 .628 .63 .635 .661 .535 .725
1996 .721 .641 .631 .631 .638 .627 .603 .622 .622 .627 .652 .521 .671 .721
1997 .71 .629 .621 .622 .63 .619 .596 .613 .612 .618 .642 .511 .649 .661 .71
1998 .708 .628 .619 .618 .625 .615 .591 .61 .609 .614 .636 .506 .642 .649 .667 .708
1999 .708 .628 .617 .617 .623 .614 .59 .61 .605 .609 .63 .502 .635 .639 .652 .665 .708
2000 .701 .622 .611 .612 .62 .61 .583 .6 .595 .601 .623 .497 .625 .629 .637 .649 .662 .701
2001 .687 .61 .598 .599 .605 .595 .573 .589 .584 .587 .605 .479 .608 .612 .62 .629 .639 .65 .687
2002 .67 .595 .586 .588 .591 .581 .559 .575 .568 .573 .592 .471 .59 .594 .597 .606 .613 .617 .621 .67
2003 .616 .547 .539 .544 .542 .532 .516 .533 .526 .53 .539 .425 .538 .541 .546 .553 .561 .564 .563 .577 .616
2004 .63 .559 .551 .552 .556 .545 .523 .541 .534 .539 .555 .441 .555 .557 .559 .567 .573 .574 .574 .584 .565 .63
2005 .634 .560 .552 .554 .558 .548 .526 .544 .536 .541 .558 .446 .557 .558 .559 .566 .570 .574 .571 .574 .543 .574 .634
2006 .634 .561 .553 .556 .557 .549 .525 .544 .535 .541 .556 .444 .553 .556 .557 .563 .568 .570 .567 .574 .538 .566 .586 .634
2007 .627 .557 .547 .55 .552 .542 .521 .538 .531 .535 .548 .436 .547 .549 .551 .556 .560 .562 .557 .561 .525 .552 .570 .591
Notes: Frequencies of observations present in the sample at years described by row and column, relative to the full sample
Table 3: Autocorrelation matrix of earnings residuals
1978 1979 1980 1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1977 .438
1978 .280 .424
1979 .241 .367 .563
1980 .211 .343 .478 .539
1982 .223 .326 .439 .499 .733
1984 .221 .306 .401 .411 .665 .814
1985 .216 .301 .368 .430 .643 .785 .807
1986 .161 .266 .386 .441 .634 .767 .772 .853
1987 .156 .260 .401 .459 .634 .756 .744 .809 .871
1988 .134 .254 .368 .421 .617 .733 .730 .776 .830 .874
1989 .135 .239 .321 .383 .557 .682 .681 .726 .790 .824 .857
1991 .145 .221 .334 .370 .577 .685 .679 .721 .765 .798 .821 .887
1992 .134 .193 .306 .333 .515 .619 .619 .667 .724 .738 .762 .831 .854
1993 .111 .179 .274 .314 .482 .607 .606 .644 .695 .709 .723 .810 .803 .823
1994 .102 .183 .280 .330 .480 .590 .580 .632 .696 .711 .735 .809 .815 .810 .792
1995 .109 .197 .289 .319 .491 .589 .582 .624 .686 .711 .746 .802 .815 .804 .795 .836
1996 .128 .192 .305 .315 .497 .623 .623 .653 .720 .741 .764 .826 .839 .827 .816 .854 .878
1997 .129 .198 .308 .336 .507 .625 .614 .656 .716 .737 .761 .828 .842 .833 .816 .862 .883 .932
1998 .108 .194 .294 .316 .496 .618 .610 .651 .707 .735 .756 .819 .835 .813 .797 .838 .859 .904 .939
1999 .117 .160 .294 .291 .478 .600 .594 .638 .689 .714 .730 .791 .815 .799 .784 .812 .837 .881 .908 .904
2000 .124 .179 .293 .310 .501 .619 .613 .635 .696 .715 .741 .808 .822 .802 .795 .820 .830 .885 .919 .913 .908
2001 .122 .180 .294 .296 .463 .588 .591 .616 .656 .685 .707 .776 .787 .767 .751 .779 .798 .855 .884 .880 .874 .912
2002 .122 .179 .257 .261 .415 .543 .558 .568 .577 .605 .622 .695 .720 .694 .697 .716 .720 .785 .810 .811 .811 .844 .875
2003 .128 .168 .291 .299 .469 .589 .585 .616 .669 .697 .715 .780 .794 .770 .763 .787 .799 .858 .887 .883 .877 .916 .914 .862
2004 .108 .170 .289 .296 .462 .593 .584 .610 .666 .691 .707 .773 .784 .763 .757 .781 .792 .849 .876 .877 .873 .905 .903 .854 .950
2005 .103 .155 .291 .287 .470 .595 .587 .619 .671 .698 .709 .776 .794 .771 .770 .790 .800 .853 .878 .878 .875 .903 .901 .857 .942 .957
2006 .106 .157 .286 .279 .449 .572 .558 .591 .638 .670 .677 .738 .754 .745 .732 .757 .770 .819 .840 .845 .841 .872 .874 .828 .909 .931 .952
Table 4: Autocorrelation matrix of earnings residuals in differences
1978 1979 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1979 -.400
1980 -.009 -.277
1985 -.018 -.016 -.084
1986 .003 -.031 .090 -.434
1987 .043 .093 -.013 -.058 -.345
1988 .004 .035 .011 -.055 -.046 -.299
1989 .041 -.036 -.008 .028 -.054 -.020 -.323
1992 -.053 .060 -.055 -.014 -.006 -.074 -.003 -.039
1993 -.021 .015 -.019 .007 .013 .048 -.072 .000 -.351
1994 .018 -.013 .024 .000 -.021 -.013 .003 -.037 -.108 -.385
1995 .021 -.001 .017 -.027 .029 .038 .001 .032 .043 -.070 -.519
1996 .012 -.013 -.034 .008 -.020 .000 .036 .046 .029 -.021 .026 -.440
1997 -.052 .032 -.047 .026 -.046 .006 -.022 -.058 -.007 -.005 -.004 -.019 -.520
1998 .010 -.010 .052 -.047 .049 -.040 .004 .000 .009 .015 -.031 .036 -.015 -.391
1999 .056 -.017 -.017 .013 .006 -.013 .040 -.004 .014 -.067 .004 -.020 .003 -.010 -.244
2000 -.087 .085 -.059 .008 .016 -.014 -.006 -.023 .041 .023 .005 -.042 .022 -.003 -.047 -.420
2001 .024 -.051 .051 .009 -.082 .044 -.028 .052 -.046 -.018 .032 -.009 -.062 .051 .044 -.013 -.539
2002 .008 .001 -.037 .027 .010 -.090 .046 -.025 -.019 -.002 -.043 .013 .031 .024 -.028 .005 -.010 -.298
2003 .005 -.050 .001 .041 -.040 -.108 .001 -.015 .061 -.028 .062 -.025 -.049 .052 -.006 .025 .027 -.010 -.247
2004 -.036 .068 .008 -.061 .057 .144 -.005 .004 -.047 .013 -.031 .012 .025 -.043 .005 -.024 -.025 .014 -.157 -.705
2005 .073 -.011 .001 -.021 -.017 .026 -.011 -.010 -.019 .020 .005 .004 -.001 -.009 -.013 .056 .014 -.043 .002 .012 -.227
2006 -.031 .063 -.042 .009 .035 -.025 .021 -.031 .055 -.014 .034 -.023 -.002 -.031 -.013 -.015 .013 -.028 -.002 .039 -.069 -.375
2007 -.002 -.022 -.010 -.042 -.003 -.026 .026 -.036 -.016 .079 -.070 .022 .015 -.015 -.035 .035 -.015 .020 .030 -.028 -.006 .053 -.254
Table 5: AIC criterion
ARMA(p,q) q=1 q=2 q=3
p=1 -344885 -344899 -344906
(43) (45) (47)
p=2 -345301 -345447 -345733
(47) (50) (53)
p=3 -345839 -346133 -346293
(51) (54) (58)
AIC criterion computed as -2log(L)+2K, with L the like-
lihood and K the number of parameters. Number of pa-
rameters in brackets.
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Table 6: Estimated parameters
1-1 1-2 1-3 2-1 2-2 2-3 3-1 3-2 3-3
α1 .702 .729 .711 .263 .186 .220 .200 .203 .194
( .005) ( .006) ( .007) ( .011) ( .011) ( .011) (.012) ( .011) ( .011)
α2 .145 .324 .143 .191 .143 .161
( .004) ( .008) ( .009) ( .005) ( .009) (.009)
α3 .022 .087 .187
( .003) ( .004) ( .008)
ψ1 .369 .391 .373 - .091 - .172 - .135 - .164 - .166 - .189
( .005) ( .005) ( .007) ( .011) ( .011) ( .012) (.012) ( .011) ( .011)
ψ2 .020 .017 .170 - .028 - .046 - .046
( .003) ( .003) ( .006) ( .008) ( .008) (.008)
ψ3 - .012 - .080 .114
( .004) ( .004) ( .007)
ση1 .302 .302 .301 .310 .306 .304 .306 .300 .298
( .001) ( .003) ( .003) ( .003) ( .003) ( .003) (.003) ( .003) ( .004)
ση2 .038 .039 .039 .038 .039 .036 .038 .037 .037
( .005) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
ση3 .255 .259 .256 .263 .260 .248 .258 .247 .242
( .005) ( .006) ( .006) ( .004) ( .005) ( .005) (.005) ( .006) ( .007)
ρη1,η2 .473 .413 .454 .571 .486 .610 .505 .485 .365
( .016) ( .021) .021 ( .013) ( .017) ( .013) ( .017) ( .020) ( .030)
ρη1,η3 - .604 - .548 - .586 - .694 - .618 - .729 - .636 - .620 - .509
( .003) ( .020) .019 ( .011) ( .015) ( .012) ( .016) ( .019) ( .029)
ρη2,η3 - .946 - .948 - .947 - .945 - .946 - .941 - .946 - .943 - .944
( .023) ( .003) .003 ( .002) ( .002) ( .003) ( .002) ( .003) ( .004)
σy0 .491 .506 .496 .448 .479 .429 .442 .455 .494
( .000) ( .007) ( .007) ( .004) ( .005) ( .004) (.004) ( .005) ( .008)
σy−1 .381 .424 .359 .387 .386 .428
( .004) ( .005) ( .004) ( .004) ( .005) (.008)
σy−2 .264 .270 .299
( .004) ( .006) ( .008)
cov(η1, y0) - .227 - .257 - .237 - .156 - .214 - .149 -.186 - .201 - .282
( .019) ( .017) .017 ( .015) ( .016) ( .016) ( .016) ( .017) ( .019)
cov(η1, y−1) - .127 - .183 - .113 - .153 - .168 - .253
( .016) ( .017) ( .017) ( .017) ( .018) (.020)
cov(η1, y−2) - .169 - .185 - .267
( .018) ( .019) ( .022)
cov(η2, y0) .358 .402 .374 .232 .335 .155 .219 .253 .361
( .022) ( .020) .021 ( .017) ( .019) ( .021) ( .020) ( .022) ( .026)
cov(η2, y−1) .218 .331 .119 .242 .235 .352
( .019) ( .021) ( .024) ( .022) ( .025) (.029)
cov(η2, y−2) .239 .253 .351
( .024) ( .027) ( .032)
cov(η3, y0) - .290 - .333 - .305 - .179 - .270 - .107 - .163 - .195 - .291
( .018) ( .023) .023 ( .020) ( .022) ( .023) ( .023) ( .024) ( .029)
cov(η3, y−1) - .169 - .272 - .077 - .190 - .181 - .287
( .021) ( .023) ( .025) ( .023) ( .027) (.032)
cov(η3, y−2) - .181 - .194 - .282
( .026) ( .029) ( .035)
cov(y0, ζ0) .809 .036 - .024 - .823 .826 - .931 .841 - .795 .812
( .023) (8.525) 26.529 ( .269) ( .059) ( .207) (.061) ( .416) ( .096)
cov(y0, ζ−1) .779 - .012 .408 - .352 - .208 .361
( .438) 1.245 ( .102) (17.542) (152.666) (31.114)
cov(y−1, ζ−1) .798 .722 - .066 .830 .234
(.813) ( .062) ( .148) (41.955) (17.858)
cov(y0, ζ−2) - .805 - .719
(3.931) (76.705)
cov(y−1, ζ−2) - .382 - .202
(11.249) (44.061)
cov(y−2, ζ−2) .752
( .094)
Table 7: Yearly standard deviation of earnings
1-1 1-2 1-3 2-1 2-2 2-3 3-1 3-2 3-3
1978 .311 .312 .312
( .001) ( .002) ( .002)
1979 .254 .257 .255 .222 .232 .219
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001)
1980 .223 .223 .223 .222 .227 .221 .224 .224 .230
( .005) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.002) ( .002) ( .002)
1981 .264 .260 .263 .000 .103 .002 .004 .006 .001
( .005) ( .005) ( .005) ( .096) ( .040) ( .066) (.082) ( .076) ( .060)
1982 .152 .150 .150 .194 .193 .197 .193 .195 .198
( .005) ( .005) ( .005) ( .002) ( .002) ( .002) (.002) ( .002) ( .002)
1983 .244 .243 .247 .040 .175 .096 .023 .039 .193
( .004) ( .005) ( .005) ( .063) ( .017) ( .037) (.048) ( .049) ( .021)
1984 .154 .149 .149 .189 .184 .187 .188 .188 .182
( .001) ( .004) ( .004) ( .002) ( .001) ( .002) (.001) ( .001) ( .002)
1985 .182 .182 .182 .181 .183 .183 .181 .183 .183
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1986 .187 .187 .187 .189 .189 .190 .190 .190 .192
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1987 .181 .182 .181 .176 .176 .177 .176 .177 .177
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1988 .180 .180 .181 .181 .181 .181 .181 .182 .183
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1989 .171 .172 .172 .168 .170 .169 .169 .170 .171
( .008) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1990 .012 .021 .005 .358 .303 .375 .349 .395 .363
( .002) ( .007) ( .008) ( .012) ( .008) ( .015) (.012) ( .016) ( .013)
1991 .182 .184 .180 .153 .167 .156 .161 .157 .163
( .001) ( .002) ( .002) ( .002) ( .001) ( .002) (.001) ( .002) ( .001)
1992 .162 .162 .162 .159 .155 .159 .157 .160 .161
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1993 .207 .207 .207 .209 .209 .209 .210 .209 .211
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1994 .237 .236 .237 .250 .250 .251 .252 .253 .254
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1995 .193 .195 .194 .177 .179 .177 .177 .178 .180
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1996 .177 .177 .177 .176 .178 .177 .177 .177 .178
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1997 .167 .167 .167 .162 .162 .162 .162 .162 .164
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1998 .137 .138 .138 .134 .137 .135 .135 .136 .138
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1999 .152 .152 .152 .155 .157 .157 .156 .157 .158
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .000) ( .000) ( .000) (.000) ( .000) ( .001)
2000 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .160
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
2001 .158 .158 .158 .159 .159 .160 .159 .160 .161
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
2002 .153 .153 .153 .146 .146 .146 .146 .147 .149
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
2003 .168 .167 .168 .178 .178 .179 .179 .180 .181
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
2004 .147 .148 .148 .133 .133 .134 .133 .134 .135
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
2005 .128 .128 .128 .130 .132 .130 .131 .131 .133
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
2006 .123 .124 .123 .124 .124 .124 .125 .125 .127
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .000) ( .000) ( .000) (.000) ( .000) ( .000)
2007 .117 .117 .117 .115 .116 .116 .115 .117 .118
( .003) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
Table 8: Short term inequalities and their decomposition
Short term Decomposition
Perm. (%) Trans. (%)
Full sample
1977 .167 .033 .966
1981 .095 .336 .663
2007 .151 .886 .113
Mean .129 .648 .351
Age of entry < 20
1977 .195 .008 .991
1981 .089 .225 .774
2007 .113 .872 .127
Mean .104 .574 .425
Age of entry ≥ 20 and < 24
1977 .121 .084 .915
1981 .091 .432 .567
2007 .187 .900 .099
Mean .154 .682 .317
Age of entry ≥ 24
1977 .134 .197 .802
1981 .125 .606 .393
2007 .276 .889 .110
Mean .233 .721 .278
Inequality is measured with the variance of logs.
Short term inequality: cross sectional inequality.
Perm. stands for the share of cross sectional inequal-
ity due to the permanent heterogeneity components.
Trans. stands for the share of cross-section inequal-
ity due to the transitory component.
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Individual Sample Quantiles
effects periods 0.05 0.2 0.35 0.5 0.65 0.8 0.95
(3,15] -2.97 0.483 1.74 2.43 3.04 4.31 8.14
(2.31) (0.603) (0.194) (0.0557) (0.132) (0.488) (1.97)
(15,22] 1.52 2.11 2.32 2.51 2.7 3 3.8
η1 (0.0708) (0.023) (0.0191) (0.0221) (0.0208) (0.031) (0.0522)
(22,26] 2 2.25 2.39 2.52 2.67 2.87 3.46
(0.0226) (0.0182) (0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0175) (0.021) (0.0345)
(26,28] 2.13 2.35 2.47 2.58 2.7 2.86 3.26
(0.024) (0.0159) (0.0147) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0151) (0.0318)
(3,15] -0.435 -0.162 -0.0538 0.0203 0.0937 0.205 0.539
(0.17) (0.0478) (0.0182) (0.00945) (0.013) (0.0412) (0.148)
(15,22] -0.124 -0.032 0.00555 0.033 0.0601 0.0973 0.194
η2 (0.00983) (0.00439) (0.00321) (0.00313) (0.00322) (0.00415) (0.00951)
(22,26] -0.0471 -0.00103 0.0203 0.0388 0.0567 0.0834 0.141
(0.00396) (0.00264) (0.00246) (0.00216) (0.00245) (0.00267) (0.00554)
(26,28] -0.0218 0.00914 0.0254 0.0383 0.0526 0.073 0.114
(0.00333) (0.00221) (0.00214) (0.00207) (0.00216) (0.00252) (0.00415)
(3,15] -6.27 -2.14 -0.706 -0.00853 0.751 2.24 5.71
(2.11) (0.576) (0.147) (0.0858) (0.212) (0.712) (2.47)
(15,22] -1.44 -0.622 -0.324 -0.125 0.0874 0.395 1.29
η3 (0.0847) (0.033) (0.0254) (0.0221) (0.0287) (0.0315) (0.121)
(22,26] -0.907 -0.443 -0.275 -0.142 -0.024 0.131 0.445
(0.0469) (0.019) (0.0167) (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0344)
(26,28] -0.632 -0.36 -0.242 -0.147 -0.0542 0.0559 0.269
(0.0232) (0.0165) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0147) (0.0163) (0.0267)
Notes: Sample period: Number of observed periods. Standard errors (sampling and parameter uncertainty, 1000 MC
simulations) in brackets.
Table 9: Quantiles of the distribution of individual effects: unconstrained estimates
Sample periods V ar(η1) Cov(η1, η2) Cov(η1, η3) V ar(η2) Cov(η2, η3) V ar(η3)
(3,15] 11 0.93 -12 0.093 -1.1 14
(15) (1.2) (16) (0.095) (1.3) (17)
(15,22] 0.5 0.057 -0.57 0.01 -0.09 0.83
(0.081) (0.011) (0.11) (0.0016) (0.015) (0.15)
(22,26] 0.14 0.011 -0.099 0.0038 -0.027 0.2
(0.0073) (0.0011) (0.0091) (0.00032) (0.0024) (0.018)
(26,28] 0.076 0.0043 -0.038 0.002 -0.013 0.09
(0.0039) (0.00058) (0.0041) (0.00015) (0.00097) (0.0066)
Complete sample 2.6 0.22 -2.8 0.024 -0.27 3.3
(3.2) (0.25) (3.4) (0.021) (0.28) (3.8)
Random effects 0.093 0.0059 -0.05 0.0015 -0.0093 0.066
(0.0034) (0.00049) (0.0038) (0.00011) (0.00077) (0.0058)
Notes: The first four lines are obtained using fixed effect estimates. Sample periods = number of observed
periods. Standard errors (sampling and parameter uncertainty, 1000 MC simulations) between brackets.
Table 10: Estimates of the covariance of individual effects
Sample periods V ar(η1) Cov(η1, η2) Cov(η1, η3) V ar(η2) Cov(η2, η3) V ar(η3)
(3,15] 2.5 0.2 -2.7 0.024 -0.25 3.1
(11) (0.89) (12) (0.077) (1) (13)
(15,22] 0.31 0.031 -0.31 0.005 -0.043 0.41
(0.13) (0.016) (0.16) (0.0023) (0.022) (0.22)
(22,26] 0.1 0.0076 -0.065 0.0018 -0.013 0.096
(0.014) (0.0021) (0.017) (0.00051) (0.0038) (0.029)
(26,28] 0.047 0.0021 -0.016 0.00029 -0.001 0.0043
(0.0072) (0.001) (0.0073) (0.00025) (0.0017) (0.012)
Complete sample 0.65 0.053 -0.67 0.0069 -0.068 0.78
(2.3) (0.19) (2.6) (0.017) (0.22) (2.8)
Random effects 0.093 0.0059 -0.05 0.0015 -0.0093 0.066
(0.0035) (0.00053) (0.0041) (1e-04) (0.00075) (0.0058)
Notes: See Table above
Table 11: Estimates of the covariance of individual effects: Bias-corrected
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Restrictions −→ η2 < 0 η3 < 0 η3 + piTη2 < 0
Sample periods
(3,15] 0.065 0.073 0.092
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
(15,22] 0.058 0.087 0.11
(0.0094) (0.013) (0.014)
(22,26] 0.023 0.037 0.079
(0.0049) (0.0066) (0.011)
(26,28] 0.0066 0.013 0.033
(0.0026) (0.0049) (0.0076)
Notes: Sample periods = number of observed periods. 5 per
cent level rejection frequency of single-dimensional tests of re-
strictions. Standard errors (sampling and parameter uncer-
tainty, 1000 MC simulations) between brackets.
Table 12: Frequencies of violations: single-dimensional restriction
Sample periods P-values <0.10 0.05 0.01
(3,15] 0.18 0.14 0.09
(0.01) (0.0093) (0.0093)
(15,22] 0.19 0.14 0.076
(0.01) (0.009) (0.0073)
(22,26] 0.13 0.093 0.06
(0.0077) (0.0068) (0.0054)
(26,28] 0.062 0.038 0.018
(0.006) (0.0047) (0.0029)
Complete sample 0.13 0.096 0.058
(0.0045) (0.0038) (0.003)
Notes: Sample periods = number of observed periods. Fre-
quency of p-values of the test of restrictions satisfying the con-
ditions. Standard errors (sampling and parameter uncertainty,
20 Monte Carlo simulations) between brackets. Statistic dis-
tribution obtained by 150 replications.
Table 13: Frequencies of violations: global restriction
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Quantiles Observed distance Simulated distance
0.175 0 0
0.225 0.0021 0.00180
0.275 0.0141 0.0132
0.325 0.0370 0.0391
0.375 0.0763 0.0761
0.425 0.126 0.125
0.475 0.194 0.194
0.525 0.276 0.282
0.575 0.401 0.395
0.625 0.568 0.531
0.675 0.763 0.714
0.725 1.04 0.945
0.775 1.48 1.21
0.825 2.14 1.57
0.875 3.17 2.10
0.925 5.32 2.93
0.975 12.7 4.74
Notes: Distances use as a metric the inverse covariance matrix
of ηs. Simulations are performed by adding to the constrained
estimates a normal noise and by reprojecting on the constrained
set.
Table 14: Distances between unconstrained and constrained estimates for observations and sim-
ulations
Summaries Mean Std error
Min. 0.0567 3.18e-05
1st Qu. 0.123 7.07e-05
Median 0.129 7.92e-05
Mean 0.14 0.000138
3rd Qu. 0.141 0.000154
Max 1.25 0.00662
Notes: 4292 observations for which the number of periods is over
22.
Table 15: Distribution of the returns to investment (lower bound)
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Figure 1: Mean log earnings by age at entry: 1977-2007
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(A) full sample (B) by age of entry
Figure 2: Cross-sectional variance of earnings: 1977-2007
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Figure 3: Autocorrelations with 1986 and 2007
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Figure 4: Autocorrelations of order 1 and of order 6
70
Figure 5: Random, fixed effect and biased-corrected fixed effect predictions of earnings variances
using permanent components
71
Figure 6: Scatter plot of η2 and η3 and the area describing the structural constraint
72
Figure 7: Earnings variances (permanent components): Constrained estimates and simulated
constrained estimates
73
Figure 8: The density of the terminal capitalized discount rate κ
74
Note: Sample of 4292 observations for which observed periods>22. Standard errors are due to sampling and
parameter uncertainty (30 Monte Carlo replications)
Figure 9: Counterfactual: Additional Years of Life Expectancy (K=2), Mean (Top panel) and
Variance (Bottom Panel) Lower bound Impact75
